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INTRODUCTION 
The people of Missouri deserve a supreme court that will follow the law. 
Instead they are stuck with one seemingly determined to follow prevailing 
political whims.1 
Early in 2019, the highest Court of Missouri’s northern neighbor Iowa 
brought fairness to the operation of that state’s Medicaid framework.2  It did 
not do so by, as some are asserting, over-reaching its authority and creating 
new law where none existed.3  Instead, it did so by acknowledging relevant 
existing law.4  Unfortunately, the Republican-dominated Iowa Legislature 
disagreed and quickly ensured that Good v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Services 
would have little chance to benefit anyone other than the prevailing litigant.5  
The road to the Iowa Court’s decision should not be forgotten—be it in Iowa 
or Missouri or any state with relevant comparable law.  
The Iowa Court ruled that the Department of Human Services is a 
public accommodation for purposes of civil rights law and, as a result, is 
constrained by the trans-inclusive language of the Iowa Civil Rights Act 
(ICRA).6  In doing so, the court did not truly break new ground, but instead 
brought back to life land that had been poisoned by animosity toward trans 
existence. For even without explicit trans-inclusive statutory language, a 
federal court had long ago invalidated an informal state policy excluding 
transition-related healthcare.7 That decision rested heavily on contemporary 
consensus of medical professionals regarding the efficacy of such procedures. 
After several years of anti-trans scholarship designed to create the appearance 
of a lack of consensus,8 the Iowa agency promulgated a formal anti-trans 
                                                 
1 Carrie Severino, Judicial Activism in Missouri, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 1, 2019, 3:24 PM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/judicial-activism-in-missouri/.   
2 Good v. Iowa Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 924 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa 2019). The plaintiffs have been 
less successful in obtaining attorney’s fees following the victory. Good v. Iowa Dep’t of 
Hum. Servs., 2019 Iowa App. LEXIS 968 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).  
3 Todd Blodgett, Taxpayer-Funded Transgender Services Jeopardize Medicaid, DES MOINES 
REG.   (Mar.  14,  2019,   8:58  AM),  https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/ 
columnists/2019/03/14/costly-taxpayer-funded-transgender-services-undermine-medicaid/ 
3155724002/. 
4  Good, 924 N.W.2d at 860–62 (citing Iowa Code §§ 216.7(1)(a) and 216.2(13)(b) (2019)).  
5 See 2019 Iowa Acts Ch. 85, §93, 2019 Iowa Acts 45 (codified as amended at IOWA CODE 
§ 216.7 (1993)).  
6 See 2007 Iowa Acts Ch. 191, 2007 Iowa Acts 625. 
7 Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 1980).  
8 Compare Jon K. Meyer & Donna J. Reter, Sex Reassignment: Follow-Up, 36 ARCHIVE 
GEN. PSYCH. 1010 (1980); and JANICE RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING 
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policy,9 which eventually did withstand a federal court challenge.10 In 2007 
came the addition of sexual orientation and gender identity to the ICRA, the 
latter of which the Good court relied upon. 
 Lost in the decades of commotion, however, was that Iowa’s 2007 
trans-inclusive civil rights protections were preceded by a different act of the 
Iowa Legislature which plainly and clearly placed the concept of change of 
sex within the auspices of positive Iowa law. That enactment was a 
transsexual birth certificate statute.11 It preceded the ICRA expansion 
legislation by 31 years. Yet, nowhere in the published decision in 2019’s 
Good v. Iowa DHS, the decision Good supplanted (Smith v. Rasmussen12) or 
the decision that it supplanted (Pinneke v. Preisser13) can any mention be 
found of the legislative imprimatur given to surgical (and even non-
surgical14) transition by Iowa’s 1975–76 Democratic legislative majority and 
by Republican Governor Robert Ray.15   
The Good court did acknowledge and utilize one aspect of relevant 
law in coming to its conclusion. In doing so, it missed the opportunity to 
acknowledge the other piece of Iowa’s trans-positive law. This article, 
however, is not about Iowa law. 
My focus is on how, mere weeks before Good, the Missouri Supreme 
Court did not let such an opportunity slip by. In R.M.A. v. Blue Springs R-IV 
Sch. Dist. a young trans man had alleged that denial of access to the public 
accommodation of male-designated restrooms and locker room facilities was 
sex discrimination.16 A five-judge majority found that, at the very least, his 
                                                 
OF THE SHE-MALE 178 (1979) (all opposing the legitimacy of surgical sex reassignment); 
with Michael Fleming, Carol Steinman, and Gene Bocknek, Methodological Problems in 
Assessing Sex-Reassignment Surgery: A Reply to Meyer and Reter, 9 ARCHIVE SEXUAL 
BEHAV. 541 (1980); Carol Z. Steinman, Study of Transsexuals Has Just Begun, 19 TV/TS 
TAPESTRY, 4 (1980); and, A Great Conspiracy?, TRANSGENDER TAPESTRY, Winter 2002 at 
31-32 (all calling into question the objectivity of anti-trans work that was being popularized 
in the early 1980s).  
9 Good, 2019 Iowa Supp. LEXIS 19 at *21. 
10 Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001).  
11 1976 Iowa Acts Ch. 1111.  
12 See Smith, 249 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 2001), reversing, Smith v. Rasmussen, 57 F. Supp. 2d 
736 (N.D. Iowa 1999).  
13 Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d (8th Cir. 1980).  
14 IOWA CODE §144.23(3) (2019) (“by reason of surgery or other treatment”).  
15 Oddly enough, it did appear in the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2009 marriage equality decision–
despite no trans litigants being involved in that case. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 
(Iowa 2009).  
16 568 S.W.3d 420 (Mo. 2019). 
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allegation fit within the sex discrimination expectations of the Missouri 
Human Rights Act (MHRA).17 Chief Justice Fischer, in dissent, found 
R.M.A.’s legal sex to be irrelevant and that, by holding otherwise, the 
majority had “ignored the crux of the petition while discarding the substance 
of the MHRA.”18 Justice Wilson and the majority saw Fischer as essentially 
suggesting that “R.M.A.’s sex was determined by the genitalia he displayed 
at birth and can never be changed.” Significantly, albeit tucked away in a 
footnote, Wilson noted that “no lesser authority than the General Assembly 
has acknowledged that one’s sex may not remain throughout a person's life 
what it was identified to be when that person was born.”19 
This article does praise the Missouri court for acknowledging the 
clear, trans-positive aspects of the state’s legal framework. However, the 
larger purpose of the article is to offer background that would have made the 
R.M.A. majority’s footnote seven a bit more robust. It is background that the 
Missouri court should employ when it is next faced with questions of how 
trans people fit into the concept of discrimination based on “sex” as it exists 
in Missouri law. Additionally, it is historical context that courts in other states 
that do have a sex discrimination statute and a trans birth certificate statute 
but that lack an explicitly trans-inclusive civil rights statute should consider 
in similar cases.  
The R.M.A. majority’s pointing to the existence of Missouri’s 
transsexual birth certificate statute was a good start—a very good start. It 
cannot cancel out a notorious pre-Good instance of the Iowa Supreme Court 
failing to acknowledge that state’s trans birth certificate statute (or anything 
pointing to the legitimacy of trans existence), a failure which excluded trans 
people from the scope of Iowa’s state sex anti-discrimination law.20 But with 
                                                 
17 Id. at 427 n.7 (Wilson, J.).  
18 Id. at 433 (Fischer, C.J., dissenting).  
19 Id. at 427 n.7 (Wilson, J.) (citing MO. REV. STAT. 193.215.9 (2019)).  
20 Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983). Audra Sommers 
brought suit on both sex and disability theories, losing on both. The Iowa Supreme Court 
seemingly was so eager to close the courthouse door to transsexuals that it used language on 
the disability prong so sweeping that the state, even after it had prevailed against Audra 
Sommers, begged the court for a revision so as not to disadvantage all future disability 
claimants. Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing, Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 
N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (No. 2-68164). Sommers’ counsel shared that concern but, not 
surprisingly, also sought to revise the outcome to Sommers’ benefit. Appellant’s Petition for 
Rehearing, Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (No. 2-
68164). The court did constrict the scope of its ruling but still chose to leave trans people as 
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the very real possibility that the U.S. Supreme Court will knock down the 
Price Waterhouse of cards that is federal trans anti-discrimination law,21 trans 
people, legal practitioners and otherwise, need to be ready, willing and able 
to use every element of trans-positive law that actually does exist—and to use 
them in every conceivable way. 
The phrase gender ideology22 has become a go-to conservative 
scaremongering cudgel, a 21st century replacement for now-obsolete calls to 
“protect the family” from marriage equality.23 Part II of this Article is a 
reminder that the law Justice Wilson pointed to is not the product of anything 
from the 21st century. Instead, Missouri’s General Assembly enacted it over 
a third of a century ago, with Republicans in both the White House and the 
Missouri governor’s mansion. Part III is a lesson in temporal proximity. Not 
only does the vintage of the Missouri transsexual birth certificate statute stand 
in contrast to persistent assumptions about the newness of the “trans agenda” 
                                                 
strangers to Iowa’s civil rights laws, a status quo that would hold for almost a quarter-
century.  
21 See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted 2019 U.S. LEXIS 2846 (U.S. April 22, 2019) (certiorari granted both on the question 
of the validity of trans claims based on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), 
and its progeny, as well as whether trans people are per se covered under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2019).  
22 Gillian Kane, ‘Gender Ideology’: Big, Bogus and Coming to a Fear Campaign Near You, 
GUARDIAN (March 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/ 
30/gender-ideology-big-bogus-and-coming-to-a-fear-campaign-near-you. The phrase 
“gender ideology” appeared in some form in many of the anti-trans briefs submitted to the 
Court in Harris. See Brief Amici Curiae of U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, et. al. at ix, 
23; Brief Amici Curiae of Billy Graham Evangelical Association, et. al. at iv., 12; Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Dr. Paul R. McHugh at iv, 31; and Brief of Scholars of Family and Sexuality 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 31  (all “gender ideology”); Brief of Scholars of 
Philosophy, Theology, Law, Politics, History, Literature, and the Sciences as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 17, 19, 28; and Brief of National Media and Policy Groups that 
Study Sex and Gender Identity as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers at 1, 29 (both 
“gender identity ideology” and “gender ideology”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Center for 
Arizona Policy in Support of Petitioner at 2, 20, 25, 29; and Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Foundation for Moral Law in Support of Petitioner at 3; Brief of Walt Heyer, et. al. in Support 
of Petitioner at 8 (all “transgender ideology”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Women’s Liberation 
Front in Support of Petitioner at 5 (“‘gender identity’ argument is an ideology”); and Amicus 
Brief of Free Speech Advocates in Support of Petitioner at 1 (“totalitarian ideology of 
transgenderism”).  
23 See generally, Roger Severino, Pentagon’s Radical New Transgender Policy Defies 
Common   Sense,  CNS   NEWS  (June  1,  2016,  10:32  AM),   https://www.cnsnews.com/ 
commentary/roger-severino/pentagons-radical-new-transgender-policy-defies-common-
sense.  
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(another neo-scaremongering gem),24 it also places the law only a general 
assembly session away from the session that enacted the MHRA provision at 
issue in R.M.A. Part IV questions why it has taken this long for state-law 
combinations of sex discrimination and transsexual birth certificates to add 
up to at least some cracking open of courthouse doors for trans litigants. 
One thing this article is not is an extensive examination of the entirety 
of either the R.M.A. litigation or of the larger issue of younger trans people’s 
equal access to the educational system. In no way should this be read as a 
slight to them. They are, after all, the future. But they—as well as the rest of 
us—should be able to benefit from all of what has come before. The article’s 
conclusion will address the extent to which all of that—not just the trans birth 
certificate statutes in and of themselves but how they logically should be 
interpreted as positively enhancing state sex discrimination law—should 
stand to benefit trans people even if the Supreme Court surprises everyone 
by accepting the most trans-positive interpretations of Title VII.  
For trans kids will one day be trans adults. Some of them may at some 
point in their lives find themselves seeking work from businesses that 
regularly employ less than fifteen people. Even if a legitimate25 incarnation 
of the federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA)26 or the 
Equality Act27 becomes law, it seems likely that, as Title VII now does, it 
will only encompass those entities employing fifteen or more people. With 
the MHRA filling the gap between businesses employing fifteen or more 
people and those employing six or more, even the most trans-favorable EEOC 
v. Harris Funeral Homes decision imaginable will not relegate the legal and 
historical analysis set out in this article to the dustbin of arcane academic 
discourse.  
                                                 
24 See generally, Stella Morabito, How the Trans-Agenda Seeks to Redefine Everyone, 
FEDERALIST (June 23, 2014), https://thefederalist.com/2014/06/23/how-the-trans-agenda-
seeks-to-redefine-everyone/.  
25 Read: trans-inclusive.  
26 See generally, Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (as passed by Senate, Nov. 7, 2013).  
27 See generally, Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. REP. NO. 116-56, at 1–2 
(2019) (proposed amendment to the Civil Rights Act—with its fifteen-employee standard—
to include anti-LGBT discrimination).  
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I. MISSOURI’S 1984 TRANSSEXUAL BIRTH CERTIFICATE STATUTE 
In 1986, sex was objectively defined by human reproductive nature.28 
The anti-LGBT Alliance Defending Freedom (ADF) spent three 
pages of its R.M.A. amicus brief to the Missouri Supreme Court attempting 
to support the above-quoted proposition.29 It cited the DSM-V and several 
dictionaries.30 It also pointed to Missouri precedent31 approving the use of 
dictionaries to discern the “plain meaning”32 of a term which lacks a 
legislatively-supplied one. The 1983 Missouri Supreme Court opinion in 
Sermchief v. Gonzales then served as the basis for the assertion: “The 
meaning is to be discerned as of the time the law was enacted.”33 
 The ADF omitted much more regarding the Sermchief analysis of 
legislative intent than it included. “Fundamentally, we seek to ascertain the 
intent of the lawmakers and to give effect to that intent,” Justice Warren 
Welliver wrote.34 He pointed to the manners in which a court might 
accomplish that. One would be to attribute “to the words used in the statute 
their plain and ordinary meaning.”35 Another would be to look to “the general 
purposes of the legislative enactment.”36 Yet another would be to identify 
both the problems that the legislature sought to remedy as well as the 
circumstances and conditions existing at the time of enactment.37 Perhaps 
                                                 
28 Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18–
21, R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist. (Mo. No. SC96683) (filed 
March 26, 2018).  
29 Id.  
30 Almost one-third of the space is devoted to a footnote asserting that trans people and their 
supporters are either confused or disingenuous about the appropriateness of introducing 
intersex matters into discussions of trans issues. “[S]uch conditions are rare, objectively 
diagnosable disorders of normal sexual development, and are quite unlike a theory of 
subjectively perceived continuum of genders suggested by gender identity theory 
advocates.” Id. at 19-20 n.10.  
31 State v. Moore, 303 S.W.3d 515, 520 (Mo. 2010).  
32 Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 28, at *18.  
33 Id. (citing Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 688-89 (Mo. 1983)).  
34 Sermchief, 660 S.W.2d at 688. 
35 Id. at 688 (citing Bank of Crestwood v. Gravois Bank, 616 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1981); Kieffer 
v. Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d 915 (Mo. 1979); Beiser v. Parkway Sch. Dist., 589 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. 
1979); State ex rel. Conservation Comm’n v. LePage, 566 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. 1978)).  
36 Id. (citing Eminence R-1 Sch. Dist. v. Hodge, 635 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. 1982); Bank of 
Crestwood, 616 S.W.2d at 510).  
37 Id. at 688–89 (citing Kieffer, 590 S.W.2d at 918; State ex rel. Zoological Park Subdist. of 
the City and County of St. Louis v. Jordan, 521 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1975); Mashak v. Poelker, 
367 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1963)).  
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most notably, Welliver added that amended statutes, such as the nursing 
practice provisions at issue in Sermchief, “shall be construed on the theory 
that the legislature intended to accomplish a substantive change in the law.”38 
 This portion of the article is not about any statutory changes that the 
Missouri General Assembly made in 1986; Part III will examine those 
changes. Instead, this portion is about one change that the Missouri General 
Assembly made in 1984. That change, even without a progressive call-out to 
textualism, undermines most, if not all, of the anti-trans arguments about the 
General Assembly’s decision-making two years later. Sadly, as with similar 
statutory changes in so many other states, it went all but unnoticed. 
 The Missouri Supreme Court issued Sermchief on November 22, 
1983.39 Three weeks later S.B. 57440 was pre-filed for the 1984 session of the 
General Assembly. Upon enactment in the spring, it became what Justice 
Wilson referred to in R.M.A. as the acknowledgement by the Missouri 
General Assembly that “one’s sex may not remain throughout a person’s life 
what it was identified to be when that person was born.”41  
With some modifications, this “Uniform Vital Statistics Law” was an 
adoption of the 1977 Model State Vital Statistics Act.42 The language from 
the Model Act that has been of interest to trans people is: 
Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of (a court of 
competent jurisdiction) indicating the sex of an individual 
born in this State has been changed by surgical procedure and 
that such individual’s name has been changed, the certificate 
of birth of such individual shall be amended as prescribed in 
Regulation 10.8(e) to reflect such changes.43 
The Missouri language read in 1984 (and still reads): 
                                                 
38 Id. at 689 (citing City of Willow Springs v. Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 
1980); Kilbane v. Director of the Dep’t of Revenue, 544 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1976); and Gross v. 
Merchants-Produce Bank, 390 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)).  
39 See Sermchief, 660 S.W.2d 683. 
40 1984 MO. S.B. 574 (approved April 24, 1984). See also 1984 MO. L. R. 2180.  
41 R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 427, n.7 (Mo. 
2019) (Wilson, J).  
42 MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE 1977); 
see also Memo from Governor’s Office re: SB 574 at 1, April 18, 1984, Office of the 
Governor, Kit Bond Legislative Files [hereinafter Bond Legislative Files], RG-003, Box 25, 
file SB 574, Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, Missouri (the bill “is patterned after the 
Model Vital Statistics Act adopted by the Council of State Governments”).  
43 MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §21(e) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE 
1977).  
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Upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of 
competent jurisdiction indicating the sex of an individual born 
in this state has been changed by surgical procedure and that 
such individual's name has been changed, the certificate of 
birth of such individual shall be amended.44 
A product of its time, it clearly privileges transition that includes surgery—
yet just as clearly it is a recognition by the State of Missouri that transition is 
real and that the law of the State of Missouri recognizes that reality. 
 As significant as the statute is both for Missouri-born trans people and 
for the general notion that transition is part of Missouri’s legal tapestry, it is 
not clear if any trans people played any direct, overt role in spurring the 
General Assembly to enact it.45 What is very clear, however, is that the 
funeral industry did play a role in leading the General Assembly to look 
favorably upon the Model Act: 
The bill was mainly supported by the Funeral Directors 
Association. Their interest was the elimination of the burial 
permit. A less cumbersome notification system has replaced 
the old system.46 
Existing Missouri law required a funeral director to obtain a burial permit 
from a local registrar before a body could be disposed: 
This requires considerable time and expense of the funeral 
director, especially when the local registrar is located at a 
different town from the funeral director. Because of the burial 
permit requirement, local registrars must provide a 24-hour 
service for funeral directors which is also difficult.47 
                                                 
44 1984 MO. S.B. 574 at §193.215.8 (April 24, 1984) (codified as amended at MO. REV. STAT. 
§193.215.9 (2019)).   
45 Even in states where there was some degree of open participation in the legislative process 
by trans people, often the stories behind such participation become obscured or lost. Katrina 
C. Rose, Forgotten Paths: American Transgender Legal History, 1955-2009 (Ph.D. diss. 
Univ. of Iowa 2018), 49-130 [hereinafter Forgotten Paths].   
46 Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42, at 3. For burial permits in Missouri before 1984, 
see generally 1947 MO. H.B. 65, §§ 28–30 (approved May 10, 1948) (“Uniform Vital 
Statistics Act”). For a broader look at the topic, see Ann M. Murphy, Please Don’t Bury Me 
Down in That Cold Cold Ground: The Need for Uniform Laws on the Disposition of Human 
Remains, 15 ELDER L. J. 381 (2007).  
47 Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42, at 2. The burial permit issue was also of concern 
when Colorado considered (and approved) the Model Act that same year. Hearing on S.B. 
142, Feb. 9, 1984, Before the Senate Comm. on Heath Welfare & Institutions,  Colorado 
Legislature, Audio Source: Ampex 704 ‘Archives 84-8, 10:47 a.m., Feb. 7, thru, 8:02 a.m., 
10 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 5 
A representative of the funeral lobby inquired about having the bill signed 
during a Funeral Directors Association meeting in early April. The timing 
apparently was not right. Nevertheless, the association was seen as being 
“most pleased” with the legislation.48 
S.B. 574 also had support from the Missouri Hospital Association, 
Missouri Medical Association, and Missouri Association of Osteopathic 
Physicians and Surgeons because the bill would modernize the vital records 
system.49 Garland Land, Vital Records State Registrar, pointed out two 
specific “deficiencies” in the then-existing statutory framework that S.B. 574 
would address: 
1. The present law requires us to use a procedure to amend 
birth records which Social Security and other adjudicating 
agencies find unacceptable. This causes great confusion 
among the elderly who are trying to get Social Security 
benefits. The bill provides an acceptable procedure for 
amending records. 
2. Our present law has a loophole that allows people to create 
more than one birth certificate. This violates all recognized 
principles of vital records recording. It is of particular concern 
to us because birth records can be used for fraudulent purposes 
to assume new identities. The bill corrects this problem.50 
Land also pointed out that: “the bill addresses areas on which our present law 
is silent. This will provide statutory authority for our present operating 
procedures.”   
He did not specifically mention changes of sex on birth certificates, 
but legislative materials underlying other states’ adoption of the Model Act 
during the early 1980s do. For example, a memo accompanying the bill that 
                                                 
Feb. 10,’ Colorado State Archives, Denver, Colorado (testimony of Christen Paulson) (copy 
on file with author). A gap was seen between centralized death certificate issuance and local 
burial permit issuance that could omit information the deceased’s physician(s) might know 
which could shed light on whether a seemingly uneventful death should be viewed with 
suspicion. Id. (testimony of Gabe Goldsmith).  
48 Handwritten note, dated Apr. 3, 1984, on Written Testimony of Garland Land on S.B. 574 
Pertaining to Vital Records, n.d. The written testimony has no date, but Land testified before 
the House Governmental Review Committee on Feb. 14. Missouri Senate Weekly Bill Status 
Report, Mar. 16, 1984 at 116–17; Mark Doerner, Summary of Committee Action on S.B. 
574, n.d. 
49 Id. at 1 
50 Id.  
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became New Mexico’s law in 1981 noted generally that the change of sex 
provision came from the Model Act, but added: 
This addition provides formal recognition of certificate 
revisions occurring as a result of a surgically produced gender 
change. The department has provided for this by regulations, 
and currently revises six certificates per month. This addition 
will provide guidance to attorneys and others on how to 
proceed in amending the birth certificate.51 
In Arkansas, which also put the Model Act into place in 1981, officials noted 
that the new law would “reflect some of the social customs and practices that 
are happening in Vital Records Registration,” in particular “surgical sex 
changes.”52 
Sen. Henry A. Panethiere, an attorney who had successfully 
represented union officials before the U.S. Supreme Court two decades 
earlier, was lead author of the Missouri bill.53 A Democrat from Kansas City 
and first elected in 1976, he served four terms before being successfully 
primaried in 1992.54 His only connection to anything LGB or T appears to be 
the 1984 Vital Statistics bill via its transsexual provision. 
Senate passage came on February 8 by a 33-0-1 margin.55 The House 
passed it 137-0-25 on April 3.56 No legislators of either party in either 
chamber voted against the bill, but nevertheless, two days after the House 
vote, the Senate had the opportunity to vote on the bill again, this time 
approving it 29-0-5.57 The reason for the trip back to the Senate was that some 
in the House did have a problem with one particular element of the Model 
                                                 
51 Untitled memo on Vital Statistics Act bill dated Oct. 24, 1980 at 5, Governor Bruce King 
Papers, 2nd Term, Coll. 1982-023, Box 47, Folder 910, New Mexico State Archives, Santa 
Fe, New Mexico; see also Act of Apr. 9, 1981, ch. 309, 1981 N.M. Laws 1521 (1981). 
52 Henry C. Robinson, Jr. to Joyce Warren, Sept. 10, 1980, Morriss M. Henry Papers, 
Correspondence, Documents, and Papers, 1970-1985, Box 34, Folder 5 (Vital Statistics: Sept 
10, 1980), University of Arkansas Special Collections, Fayetteville, Arkansas; see also 
Arkansas Vital Statistics Act of 1981, ch. 120, 1981 Ark. Acts 250 (1981).   
53 Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).  
54 Kate Beem, Rep. DePasco Ousts Sen. Panethiere, INDEP. EXAM’R, Aug. 5, 1992, at 1. 
(Panethiere died in 2005). Alumni Memoriam, U. OF MO. COLUM. SCH. OF L. TRANSCRIPT, 
Spring 2006, at 37. 
55 1984 MO. SENATE J. 244-45.  
56 1984 MO. HOUSE J. 1028-29.   
57 1984 MO. SENATE J. 790–91.  
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Act’s language.58 So often, conventional gay rights wisdom has held that 
trans issues are just too much for legislators to address prior to addressing, or 
even just becoming educated on, non-trans LGB concerns. However, the 
sticking point for S.B. 574 was not its transsexual provision.  
Instead, it was the rhetoric of government control over women’s 
reproductive rights that led to the divide. Foreshadowing the 
terminologically-invasive politics of two generations later,59 the House 
replaced the phrase “product of human conception” with “child” in the 
definition of “live birth” and with “fetus” in the definition of “fetal death.”60 
The vote in favor of this revision was 121-19-22.61 
Governor Kit Bond subsequently signed S.B. 574.62 As was the case 
with other conservatives who approved of such transition-recognition 
legislation during the era,63 when later serving in Congress, Bond voted for 
legislation which sought to restrict marriage recognition to those of 
heterosexual couples only. In 1996, he voted for the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which became law.64 A decade later, he supported the proposed 
Federal Marriage Amendment (FMA), which did not receive a sufficient 
number of votes to be sent to the states for ratification.65  
Section 193.215 has rarely been cited by appellate courts—with most 
such references not being to the trans provision.66  Apart from the R.M.A. 
                                                 
58 1984 MO. House J. 1026–28 (121-19-22 vote to amend S.B. 574 by striking “product of 
human conception” and adding “child” and “fetus”).   
59 See 2019 MO. H. B. 126 (approved May 24, 2019), codified in relevant part at MO. REV. 
STAT. §188.017.1 (2019) (“Right to Life of the Unborn Child Act”) (emphasis added).  
60 Compare MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §§1(f)–(g) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, 
EDUC., & WELFARE 1977) and 1984 MO. L. R. 2180 (proposed §§193.015(4) and (6)) with 
1984 MO. S.B. 574 (enacted §§193.015(4) and (6)).  
61 1984 MO. HOUSE J. 1027.  
62Governor Kit Bond News, memo dated Apr. 24, 1984 at 3 (only noting the modernization 
aspect of the law); Bond Legislative Files, supra note 42.  
63 See, e.g., 1984 COLO. ACTS. ch. 206. The underlying S.B. 142 was sponsored by then-State 
Sen. Wayne Allard, who later supported the federal DOMA in the House and the FMA in 
the Senate.  
64 104 CONG. REC. S10129 (daily ed., Sept. 10, 1996) (rollcall vote).  
65 109 CONG. REC. S5534 (daily ed., June 7, 2006).   
66 Adoption of N.L.B. v. Lentz, 212 S.W.3d 123, 124 (Mo. 2007); Bowers v. Bowers, 2017 
Mo. App. LEXIS 670 (Mo. App. June 30, 2017); C. L. v. M. T. , 335 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Mo. 
App. 2011); Wilson v. Cramer, 317 S.W.3d 206 (Mo. App. 2010); M. T. v. C. L. , 274 S.W.3d 
619 (Mo. App. 2009); Phillips v. Consol. Supply Co., 895 P.2d 574 (Idaho 1995) (non-trans 
Idaho resident sought an order from a court of that state directing Missouri to amend his 
Missouri birth certificate); see also Wolfe v. Missouri Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2006 U. S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30156 (W.D. Mo. May 17, 2006).  
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litigation, that has only been cited in trans cases from outside of Missouri—
twice—each merely as part of a string cite of trans birth certificate statutes in 
general.67  J.L.S. v. D.K.S. involved the dissolution of a marriage in which 
one spouse was trans, though the marriage was pre-transition.68 
Consequently, there was no issue of the marriage’s validity based on the trans 
spouse’s legal sex status at the time of the marriage.69 The transition, 
however, clearly played a role in the breakdown of the relationship.70 
 The Missouri Court of Appeals made no reference to the General 
Assembly’s implicit statement of transsexuality’s legitimacy71 when it 
reversed aspects of the Circuit Court’s decree that treated the trans spouse 
equitably72 and left intact a facially discriminatory visitation provision. 
“[D]uring those periods in which the minor children are in the temporary 
custody of Respondent, Respondent shall not cohabit with other transsexuals 
                                                 
67 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83 n.8 (Md. 2003); Ex parte Delgado, 2005 TSPR 95 n.16 (P.R. 
June 30, 2005). 
68 State v. Palmer, 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App. 1997). 
69 The documents in the case suggest that the trans spouse was not born in Missouri. This cis 
spouse, however, was born in Audrain County. Trial transcript at 12, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, 
(No. CV193-3633DR) (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County). I am placing the initials in quotes 
here and in other citations thereto because, even though the Court of Appeals maintained 
their anonymity, the lower court documents do utilize the full names not only of the parties 
but their children and witnesses.  
70 And not merely between the spouses, though the cis spouse explicitly stated that it was the 
primary reason for the dissolution. Trial transcript, supra note 69, at 13. A deposition shows 
that the trans spouse’s father was in no way approving of the transition. When asked if the 
use of the trans spouse’s post-transition name offended him, he answered in the affirmative 
after asserting “I didn't name him that.” Transcript at 12, telephone deposition of “K. S.”, 
May 2, 1994, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, No. CV193-3633DR (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County).  
71 The appellate court placed the term “sex-reassignment” in scare quotes, as if to place it 
outside the bounds of jurisprudence.  
72 These included specific findings by the Circuit Court (1) that the cis parent had interfered 
in the relationship between the children and the trans parent and (2) that “it would be in the 
best interest and welfare of the minor children, that they be reunited with” the trans parent. 
The Circuit Court also viewed the cis spouse to have been evasive when answering questions 
as to whether she would even comply with the court’s order of visitation and temporary 
custody. J. L. S., 943 S.W.2d at 771. It should be noted that the cis spouse’s therapist was 
the “Ministries Director” of “Biblical Christian Counseling Ministries.”  Supplemental Legal 
File at 153-56, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, No. CV193-3633DR (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles 
County). More broadly, the Circuit Court called into question all of the cis spouse’s experts 
for having no experience at all with transsexuality issues and specifically called out the 
“Ministries Director” for having “formed his opinions after one or two sessions with [cis 
spouse] without ever seeing the children.”  Amended Decree at 3-4, “J. L. S.” v. “D. K. S.”, 
(No. CV193-3633DR) (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Charles County June 20, 1995). 
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or sleep with another female.”73 However, the circuit court placed no 
analogous restrictions on the cis spouse’s cohabitation and sexual practices. 
Despite this imbalance, the court of appeals blithely dismissed the trans 
spouse’s assertion of that aspect of the decree being unconstitutional, 
declaring “the court cannot ignore the effect which the conduct of a parent 
may have on a child’s moral development.”74 
Possibly the first instance of a court recognizing that a transsexual 
birth certificate statute possesses meaning well beyond the realm of identity 
recordation occurred in one of Missouri’s neighbors. The existence of a birth 
certificate statute in Illinois allowed the state’s Supreme Court in 1978 to the 
invalidate Chicago’s anti-crossdressing ordinance (at least as applied to 
transsexuals) due to state supremacy principles. In City of Chicago v. Wilson, 
Justice Thomas Moran reasoned that, via the legislature’s 1955 enactment of 
a surgery-specific75 trans birth certificate statute: 
[T]he legislature has implicitly recognized the necessity and 
validity of such surgery. It would be inconsistent to permit 
sex-reassignment surgery yet, at the same time, impede the 
necessary therapy in preparation for such surgery. Individuals 
contemplating such surgery should, in consultation with their 
doctors, be entitled to pursue the therapy necessary to insure 
the correctness of their decision.76 
This did not wholly wipe out the Chicago ordinance. It still remained as a 
weapon for use against non-transsexuals.77   
When Missouri’s trans birth certificate statute became law, St. Louis 
still maintained an “indecent or lewd act” ordinance that contained explicit 
                                                 
73 Amended Decree at 5, “J. L. S.”, (No. CV193-3633DR). 
74 J. L. S., 943 S.W.2d at 771.  
75 9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 1111/2, par. 73-17(1)(d)). The law has since been revised to 
accommodate non-surgical transition. ILL. PUB. ACTS No. 100-360 (2017).  
76 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1978).  
77 However, Wilson did inspire a federal court in Texas to render Houston’s anti-
crossdressing ordinance similarly inoperable against transsexuals – despite Texas not having 
a birth certificate statute. Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S. D. Tex. 1980).  The current 
incarnation of the Chicago ordinance only deals with the amount of clothing worn, not the 
type.   CHICAGO  MUN.  CODE  § 8-8-080  (2018),  http://library.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/ 
Illinois/chicago_il/title8offensesaffectingpublicpeacemorals/chapter8-
8publicmorals?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il$anc=JD_8-8-080 
(successor provision to CHICAGO MUN. CODE § 192-8).  
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anti-crossdressing language.78  However, that St. Louis ordinance never had 
the opportunity to succumb to the Wilson legal theory.79  It instead fell when 
challenged on broader constitutional grounds.80 
That challenge resulted from a raid that occurred just as the General 
Assembly was beginning its consideration of S.B. 574.81 Multiple elements 
of the ordinance were challenged, though the crossdressing language appears 
to have been easy for the federal district court to find unconstitutional in 
1985.82  The Eighth Circuit disposed of the remaining language the next 
year—in an opinion issued mere weeks after the MHRA legislation at issue 
in R.M.A. became law.83 
II. THE 1986 MISSOURI HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: INHERENT EXPANSIVENESS AND 
LATTER-DAY CONSTRICTION 
A relevant analysis of 1986 S.B. 513’s path to becoming the Missouri 
Human Rights Act (MHRA)84 is rather straightforward. Proposed by Sen. 
Wayne Goode, his chamber passed the bill on April 2 by a vote of 23-6, with 
four senators absent and one absent with leave.85 Four weeks later, the House 
passed the bill 142-9, with eleven representatives absent and one vacant 
seat.86 House amendments caused the bill to go back to the Senate that same 
day, which approved the bill 31-0, with three senators absent.87 
The enacted statute defined “discrimination” as “any unfair treatment 
based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it relates 
                                                 
78 ST. LOUIS CODE ORD. § 15.30.010 (1984) (prohibiting “appear[ing] in any public place in 
a state of nudity or in a dress not belonging to his or her sex or in an indecent or lewd dress”).  
79 It appears as though a larger group of plaintiffs, including a transitioning trans woman, 
were at one point preparing to challenge the ordinance. Masquerade is Up for St. Louis Law, 
GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, June 1984 at 1. This could have led to a Wilson-style challenge. 
However, the ultimate focus of D. C. v. City of St. Louis was drag performers arrested in the 
raid on a club known as Uncle Marvin’s.  
80 D. C. v. City of St. Louis, No. 84-1152C(3) (E.D. Mo. order dated May 13, 1985) (“[O]nly 
that portion of § 15.30.010 which makes it unlawful to appear ‘in a dress not belonging to 
his or her sex’ is stricken, and the remainder of the ordinance is operative.”).  
81 See Jim Thomas, St. Louis Bar Raided, GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, Feb. 1984 at 1; Jim 
Thomas, Another St. Louis Bar is Raided, GAY NEWS-TELEGRAPH, March 1984 at 1.    
82 D. C. v. City of St. Louis, No. 84-1152C(3) (E.D. Mo. order dated May 13, 1985).  
83 Compare D. C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652, 653–55 (8th Cir. 1986); with S.B. 513, 
83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986).  
84 S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986).  
85 1986 MO. SENATE J. 759–60.  
86 1986 MO. HOUSE J. 2026–27.  
87 1986 MO. SENATE J. 1751–53.  
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to employment or handicap.”88 It spoke to discrimination in access to public 
accommodations: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the state of Missouri are 
free and equal and shall be entitled to the full and equal use 
and enjoyment within this state of any place of public 
accommodation, as hereinafter defined, without 
discrimination or segregation on the grounds of race, color, 
religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or handicap.89 
The 1986 MHRA included a lengthy, example-laden definition of “places of 
public accommodation.” Of particular relevance, the definition encompassed: 
Any public facility owned, operated, or managed by or on 
behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision thereof, or 
any public corporation; and any such facility supported in 
whole or in part by public funds[.]90 
That definition remained for the R.M.A. court to quote. There was no explicit 
definition of “sex” for the court to quote—just as there had not been one in 
1986. 
That means that the General Assembly that year had not, as the 
Alliance Defending Freedom claimed, “objectively defined” the word “sex” 
by linking it to “human reproductive nature.”91 Yet, by addressing “sex” even 
without providing an explicit definition, did the General Assembly not 
provide the contours of a definition for the term that would more than justify 
Justice Wilson’s R.M.A. footnote seven?  The mere co-existence of a trans 
birth certificate statute and a sex discrimination statute in the same 
                                                 
88 S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT. 
213.010.2 (1986)) (emphasis added).  
89 S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT. 
213.065.1 (1986)) (emphasis added). 
90 S.B. 513, 83rd Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1986) (codified at MO. REV. STAT. 
213.010.11(e) (1986)).  
91 Brief of Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 28, at 18-21. Additionally, even though 
S.B. 98, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2017), S.B. 745, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess., (Mo. 2017), and S.B. 720, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2016) did not 
specifically target the MHRA, Chief Justice Fischer’s neglecting to mention the failure of 
the General Assembly to pass either of those bills–which would have mandated a 
chromosome-based “biological sex” standard for usage of public school restrooms, locker 
rooms and shower facilities – makes his reliance upon similar legislative inaction toward a 
decade’s worth of Missouri Non-Discrimination Act (MONA) bills appear to be somewhat 
less than intellectually honest. R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 
568 S.W.3d 420, 432 n.4 (Mo. 2019).  
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jurisdiction’s body of law conclusively negates any argument for the 
interpretive definition of “sex” sought by ADF and those of like antipathy for 
trans people.92 That argument may be too broad for some. But even those 
with such breadth should be willing to concede that when one state’s 
legislative body positively addresses “change of sex” and “sex 
discrimination” in close proximity to one another, the only legitimate 
interpretation of “sex” in that state’s law is one that includes trans people and 
the changes that occur during the course of their lives.  
Even so, proximity may not be the end of the story—or, at the very 
least, it may not enhance the story a great deal. Iowa’s legislature gave its 
approval to transsexuality six years after it enacted a sex discrimination 
statute. However, that six-year gap saw a significant turnover in legislative 
membership. Barely a third of the legislators who approved of adding “sex” 
to the Iowa Civil Rights Act in 1970 were there to offer any opinion on the 
birth certificate bill that emerged from the 1975-76 session. Nevertheless, of 
the 41 legislators who had the opportunity to vote on both, 27 of the 
legislators voted in favor of both. Only two voted yes on sex discrimination 
and no on the trans birth certificate statute; one split his votes in the opposite 
direction. The remaining eleven were absent for either one or both votes.93 
So while there is nothing in Iowa’s collective legislative history of the first 
half of the 1970s to suggest opposition to reading the birth certificate statute 
and the sex discrimination statute together, the actions of the legislators who 
considered both bills are not conclusive positive proof either. 
Missouri is a different matter. There, the trans birth certificate statute 
and the MHRA bill were considered only two years apart—with only one 
                                                 
92 As I noted in 2004, the argument would be most forceful where trans-positive law 
(typically, a birth certificate statute) precedes the “sex”-based civil rights legislation. Katrina 
C. Rose, The Proof is in the History: The Louisiana Constitution Recognises Transsexual 
Marriages and Louisiana Sex Discrimination Law Covers Transsexuals – So Why Isn’t 
Everybody Celebrating?, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 399, 444-46 (2004). At the time, I was unaware 
of Missouri having established its MHRA after it had enacted a trans birth certificate statute; 
instead, the employment focus of that article was Louisiana’s replacement of its women’s 
protection statutes with something that resembled a modern anti-discrimination regime – an 
action that took place over a decade after it had enacted a birth certificate statute. Of equal 
concern was ensuring that those who might be tempted to presume that anti-same-sex-
marriage statutes and constitutional amendments intended to wipe out recognition of 
transition understood that not only were transsexuals not the targets of such laws but that 
many in the anti-same-sex-marriage camp had cast clear pro-transsexual votes in their pasts.  
93 For a comparative breakdown of Iowa votes by legislator, see infra Appendix A.  
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election cycle intervening.94 One hundred and sixty-one out of a possible 197 
Missouri legislators (81.7% of seats) had the opportunity to vote in 1984 on 
whether Missouri public policy positively acknowledges the reality of 
transsexuality and then to vote in 1986 on whether the MHRA bill containing 
the category of “sex” should become part of Missouri law. One hundred and 
twenty-five of those 161 voted yes on both bills—meaning that over three-
quarters of those who did serve in both sessions voted yes on both and just 
under two-thirds of the total number of legislators who could serve at any one 
time voted yes on both.95 
This does not prove that all 125 of the double-yes legislators 
consciously intended to explicitly include “change of sex” within the 
MHRA’s concept of “sex.”96 However, it should remove from the scope of 
ethical argument any contentions such as that put forth by the ADF in its brief 
as well as that put forth by Justice Fischer in the R.M.A. dissent. Tennessee 
infamously inverted the intent of the Model Act in 1977 to produce a 
hardwired statutory ban on allowing trans people’s birth certificates to reflect 
the reality of transition. It should be beyond doubt that—had Missouri done 
similarly in 1984—Fischer, the ADF and all who oppose the R.M.A. 
majority’s holding would view the combination of the 1986 MHRA and a 
1984 anti-transsexual birth certificate statute as conclusive proof that trans 
people are beyond Missouri law’s boundaries of “sex.”   
The Supreme Court’s “role is to declare the meaning of the language 
used in the MHRA consistent with legislative intent.”97 The General 
Assembly said yes in 1984 to the notion that Missouri law should accept and 
acknowledge that “the sex of an individual [can be] changed by surgical 
procedure.”98 Therefore, no argument regarding the use and interpretation of 
the word “sex” as used in Missouri law should rely at all upon ordinary 
                                                 
94 In addition to the 1984 general election, there were also four resignations (Alex Fazzino, 
Bob Fowler, David Scott and Robert Jackson) and two deaths (Roy Humphreys and D. R. 
“Ozzie” Osbourn) in 1985. See 1986 MO. HOUSE J. 7.  
95 For a comparative breakdown of Missouri votes by legislator, see infra Appendix B.  
96 It is worth noting that, during his final term in the Senate, 1986 MHRA bill sponsor (and 
yes vote on the 1984 trans birth certificate bill) Wayne Goode was a co-sponsor of one of 
the earliest Missouri trans-inclusive civil rights bills. See S.B. 452, 91st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Mo. 2001). 
97 R.M.A. ex rel Appleberry v. Blue Springs R-IV Sch. Dist., 568 S.W.3d 420, 433 (Mo. 
2019) (Fischer, J., dissenting).  
98 1984 MO. S.B. 574, currently codified in relevant part at MO. REV. STAT. § 193.215.9 
(2019).  
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dictionary definitions of the word; and no such argument can ethically rely 
on any dictionary definition of “sex” that does not take into account “change 
of sex.” The importance of the breadth of “sex,” however, goes beyond 1984, 
beyond 1986, beyond R.M.A., and even beyond the boundaries of Missouri 
and its laws. 
The 1986 MHRA incorporated much of the pre-existing 
Discriminatory Practices Act.99  That 1965 Act did include “sex” among its 
protective classifications. But it did stand apart from federal law. For 
example, unlike Title VII it explicitly included “ancestry.”100 Yet not every 
difference translated to enlargement of the courthouse doorway. The mere 
existence of the MHRA has been deployed to prevent the usage of a public 
policy exception to at-will employment termination.101 Critically though, the 
1986 Act was regarded as a replacement of the 1965 Act despite existing 
Missouri law and federal Title VII continuing to serve as some guidance,102 
albeit not exclusively.103 
Slightly over a decade ago, the Missouri Supreme Court firmly 
detached the MHRA from federal law on a causational level. After Daugherty 
v. City of Maryland Heights,104 plaintiffs would need to show only that the 
complained-of adverse action targeting a protected characteristic was a 
contributing factor in the entirety of the discriminatory activity being 
challenged—not a motivating factor.105 Clearly, this was a development that 
would benefit plaintiffs—at least in the abstract. 
But then, in 2017, a very business-friendly General Assembly struck 
back. Introduced by Sen. Gary Romine, S.B. 43 began with language that 
                                                 
99 William C. Martucci, et. al., Recent Developments in Missouri: Labor and Employment 
Law, 55 UMKC L. REV. 539, 545 (1987), 
100 S.B. 235, 73rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1965). Both continued into the MHRA. 
See generally, Emily Crane, Employees Beware: How S. B. 43 Takes Missouri Anti-
Discrimination Law Too Far, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 178, 182–83 
(2018).  
101 Joseph H. Knittig, Everything You Wanted to Know About Missouri’s Public Policy 
Exception But Didn’t Know You Should Ask, 61 MO. L. REV. 949, 966 (1996) (citing Kramer 
v. St. Louis Regional Health Care Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1317 (E. D. Mo. 1991); and Wyrick 
v. TWA Credit Union, 804 F. Supp. 1176 (W.D. Mo. 1992)).  
102 Martucci, et. al., supra note 99, at 546–47.  
103 There are instances of straining to find parallel intent despite the lack of identical 
language. See Letter from Chris Koster, Att’y Gen., Mo., to Lawrence G. Rebman, Dir., Mo. 
Dep’t of Labor and Indus. Rel. (Apr. 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
104 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007).  
105 Crane, supra note 100, at 188–80; see also State ex. rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 
82 (Mo. 2003) (finding a right to a jury trial in MHRA cases).  
20 CONCORDIA LAW REVIEW Vol. 5 
would have realigned the MHRA with federal law as to causation.106 In 
committee, language crept in that would have not merely re-established an 
equilibrium but instead would have hardwired a “but for” causation standard 
into the MHRA. That precise language later disappeared, but an analogous 
intent found its way in. 
The end result of S.B. 43 was the term “because of” becoming defined 
as “as it relates to the adverse decision or action, the protected criterion was 
the motivating factor”107 and “motivating factor” meaning that “the 
employee’s protected classification actually played a role in the adverse 
action or decision and had a determinative influence on the adverse decision 
or action.”108 As Emily Crane observed, “The codification of a but-for 
causation standard suggests that the intent of Missouri lawmakers was not to 
bring the state’s standard in line with analogous federal law, but instead to 
heavily restrict plaintiffs’ ability to bring successful employment 
discrimination claims.”109 Two years have passed, but the monumental task 
that the wrongly-convicted face when forced to prove actual innocence110 
should give all pause when pondering just how heavy that restrictiveness may 
ultimately be.  
 Crane is not alone in noting how plaintiff-averse and defendant-
friendly S.B. 43 is generally.111 The NAACP even issued a travel advisory 
for Missouri when S.B. 43 was signed into law.112 Others—including many 
who opposed the bill before it became law—pointed out that it seemed to be 
                                                 
106 2017 MO. S. B. 43 (as introduced).  
107 MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(2) (2019).  
108 MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(19) (2019) (emphasis added).  
109 Crane, supra note 100, at 191.  
110 See generally, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U. S. 383, 386 (2013) (“tenable actual-
innocence gateway pleas are rare”) (Ginsburg, J. ); House v. Bell, 547 U. S. 518, 538 (2006) 
(“absolute certainty” not required, yet the relevant standard of proof is so demanding that it 
rarely is met, citing Schlup v. Delo, 513 U. S. 298 (1995)) (Kennedy, J.).  
111 See generally, Brian Stachowski, Senate Bill 43: Raising the Bar on Discrimination, ST. 
LOUIS U. L. J. ONLINE (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-
18/raising-the-bar-on-discrimination.php; Megan Crowe, Changes to the MHRA Raise 
Burden of Proof and Limit Damages for Plaintiffs, SAINT LOUIS U. L. J. ONLINE (Oct. 30, 
2017), https://www.slu.edu/law/law-journal/online/2017-18/changes-to-mhra-raise-burden-
of-proof.php. 
112 Travel Advisory for the State of Missouri, NAACP (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://tinyurl.com/yxt7ygqa. 
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very friendly to one specific employer: the bill’s sponsor, Sen. Gary Romine, 
owner of Show-Me Rent-to-Own in Sikeston.113 
 During 2017, that business was the subject of a racial discrimination 
suit. A former employee had alleged that his supervisor regularly used racial 
slurs—including telling the employee to “quit acting like a n*gger.” That 
allegation was denied.114 However, lawyers did concede an accompanying 
allegation: that there was a map on a store wall containing a circle around a 
predominantly African-American neighborhood along with the words: “Do 
not rent.”115 
 The personal interest that Romine had in the potential impact of S.B. 
43 came to light rather early in the 2017 session—and “self-dealing” is one 
of the kinder descriptions of the situation that one can find.116 Jay Benson, 
president of the Missouri Association 
of Trial Attorneys, viewed S.B. 43 and the many similar bills as together 
comprising “an epidemic” in light of the manner in which “the civil justice 
system is designed to hold people accountable when they do bad things.”117 
University of Missouri-St. Louis political 
scientist Dave Robertson said, “This kind of legislation just adds to the 
perception that legislators are benefiting themselves and using government to 
do it.”118 
Not surprisingly, most Democrats opposed the bill, yet many refused 
to vote on it at all, believing that even casting votes in opposition would make 
them complicit in Romine’s conflict of interest.119 With Republican 
majorities in the General Assembly, S.B. 43 nevertheless passed easily—
                                                 
113 Sarah Fenske, Sued for Discrimination, Missouri Senator Pushes Law Limiting 
Discrimination Suits, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/ 
newsblog/2017/04/12/sued-for-discrimination-missouri-senator-pushes-law-limiting-
discrimination-suits. 
114 Id.  
115 Id.   
116 Id.  
117 Kevin McDermott, Missouri Republicans’ Push to Limit Lawsuits Could Have 




118 Id.  
119 Jason Hancock, Missouri Bill Making it Harder for Workers to Win Discrimination Cases 
Goes  to  Greitens,  KANSAS  CITY STAR  (May  8,  2017),  https://www.kansascity.com/news/ 
politics-government/article149421579.html.  
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though not before an attempt to make lemonade out of the lemon. Farmington 
Republican Rep. Kevin Engler proposed an amendment which would have 
added sexual orientation and gender identity to the MHRA,120 essentially 
tracking the intended effect of the long-languishing Missouri Non-
Discrimination Act (MONA) proposal.121 He asserted that he was “disgusted” 
that Missouri law allowed employers to fire someone “if you find out they’re 
gay.”122 Ironically demonstrating the desirability of allowing LGBT people 
clear access to MHRA remedies, Harrisonville Republican Rick Brattin 
openly questioned whether gays are even human.123 Gay Kansas City 
Democrat Greg Razer favored the amendment but, after Engler withdrew it, 
another Kansas City Democrat, Brandon Ellington, criticized the entire 
sequence of events as a “stunt.”124 
Perhaps it was a stunt; perhaps it was not. The end result, however, 
was clear. S.B. 43 became law without the language of MONA. 
Engler’s attempt to attach pro-civil rights language to an anti-civil rights 
proposal was, by no means, the first such stunt. 
Despite not arriving until almost two decades after the first state trans 
birth certificate statute—indeed not arriving until after four of them—the first 
federal gay rights bill included no language designed to encompass anti-trans 
discrimination.125 Such was the status quo for two decades—until the first 
generation of failed “Equality Act” bills yielded to the employment-specific 
                                                 
120 S.B. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017)., House Am. No. 1, proposed at 2017 
MO. H.J. 2215 (May 8, 2017).  
121 See generally, Alex Edelman, Show-Me No Discrimination: The Missouri Non-
Discrimination Act and Expanding Civil Rights Protections to Sexual Orientation or Gender 
Identity, 79 UMKC L. REV. 741 (2011).  
122 Hancock, supra note 119.  
123 Id. (“there is a distinction between homosexuality and just a human being”).  
124 Id.  By no means was it Engler’s first “stunt.”  While in the Senate he floated a proposal 
to make littering a capital offense. Paula Barr, Senator Engler Gets Attention He Wanted, 
DAILY JOURNAL (Feb. 12th, 2009), https://dailyjournalonline.com/news/local/senator-
engler-gets-attention-he-wanted/article_3f5729cb-c45b-5001-b68b-f468a7340265.html. 
125 Equality Act of 1974, H. R. 14752, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. Interestingly, this first federal 
gay rights bill covered all areas of discrimination except in employment. See Bruce Voeller, 
NGTF on Capitol Hill: An Historical Overview of the Program for Federal Gay Rights 
Legislation, IT’S TIME, Special Bonus Issue (1976) at 1, 2. By 1974, Illinois, Arizona, 
Louisiana and Hawaii had already enacted trans birth certificate statutes. 1955 ILL. LAWS. p. 
1026; 1967 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 77; 1968 LA. ACTS Ch. 611; 1973 HAW. ACTS Ch. 39.  
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Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) generation of failed bills. One 
constant, however, was the exclusion of trans protections.126 
The then-Human Rights Campaign Fund (HRCF—now known as 
HRC) and Chai Feldblum, who played a significant role in drafting the 
language of what came to be ENDA (and later served as an EEOC 
commissioner), viewed what they were working with in the early 1990s as 
reality.127 Trans people, however, dealt with a competing reality—one in 
which far too many of their number were dying violently as the end result of 
unemployment-based homelessness. “HRCF is intentionally allowing 
transgendered people to die by pretending they don’t know it is happening,” 
Cei Bell screamed in the Philadelphia Gay News.128 There was no willingness 
to trust crumbs of theory while LGBs would, if a gay-only ENDA became 
law, feast on clear, unequivocal statutory protections. For the remainder of 
the Clinton Administration and on into the 21st century, trans people dug in 
for a war on two fronts: against HRCF and against Congress, where there had 
been little desire for any positive movement on civil rights under Democratic 
control and where there was even less under the Republican leadership 
produced by the disastrous 1994 mid-term elections.129 
Truces can occur during wartime. Some between trans activists and 
HRC(F) have materialized occasionally. In the run-up to a 1995 lobbying 
event, activists and HRCF (just weeks away from dropping its “F”) issued a 
joint statement indicating that the latter had “made a commitment to work 
with representatives of a spectrum of the transgendered community with a 
specific focus on hate crimes.”130  The statement went on to offer the hope of 
                                                 
126 See e.g. 97 CONG. REC. S1708 (daily ed., Sept. 9, 1981) (“‘[S]exual orientation’ means 
male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by orientation or practice.”); 
and Civil Rights Amendments Act of 1991. H.R. 1430, 102d Cong. (1991) (“‘Affectional or 
sexual orientation’ means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality, and bisexuality by 
orientation or practice, by and between consenting adults.”) 
127 Chari R. Feldblum, Gay People, Trans People, Women: Is It All About Gender?, 17 N.Y. 
L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623–702 (2000). 
128 Cei Bell, Transgendered Persons Deserve Inclusion and Respect, PHILADELPHIA GAY 
NEWS, July 21, 1995, at 11. 
129 See generally, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
160, § 571 (Nov. 30, 1993) (Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell); Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
of 1994, S. 2238, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced June 23, 1994) (first ENDA bill); Adam 
Clymer, G. O. P. Celebrates its Sweep; Clinton Vows to Find Common Ground, New York 
Times, Nov. 10, 1994 at A1. 
130 Kristina Campbell, Transgender Lobbyists Meet with Hill Staffers, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 
6, 1995. 
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“good faith” in a future of dialogue-engagement and coalition-building “in 
the context of ending violence and discrimination against [the trans] 
community.”131 Any focus on hate crimes would certainly address the former. 
The absence of any serious work on ENDA was a sore poised to do nothing 
but fester. Even so, following the meeting, Texas trans activist and attorney 
(and later judge) Phyllis Frye publicly declared, “There’s a very good chance 
the war with HRCF may be coming to a close.”132  
The politics of 1996 delayed the inevitable of Frye and her followers 
learning how far off the mark her prediction was.133 President Bill Clinton 
was running for re-election, and the Republican congressional leadership saw 
Hawaii’s same-sex marriage litigation134 as a wedge issue that could damage 
his chances. Republicans reflexively proposed legislation that purported to 
insulate the federal government and dissenting states from having to 
recognize same-sex marriages, should any state begin allowing them.135 This 
was, of course, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and it passed with 
ample Democratic support in addition to the votes of the Republican 
majorities. Clinton signed the bill to prevent a veto from being used against 
him in the election.136  
DOMA proved to be about more than just marriage. As Feldblum 
describes it, the Republican leadership wanted to bring the bill up for a vote 
as an embarrassment to all Democrats. However, they wanted no 
amendments that might spread the embarrassment around, such as gun 
control or health care. Sen. Ted Kennedy brokered a deal to stop all 
                                                 
131 Id.   
132 David Olson, Transgendered Activists Meet with Local, National Gay Groups, WINDY 
CITY TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995 at 10 (sec. 1).  
133 See generally, Katrina C. Rose, Has the Future Already Been Forgotten? A Post-2007 
Transgender Legal History Told Through the Eyes of the Late, (Rarely) Great Employment 
Non-Discrimination Act, 23 WILLIAM & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 527– 637 (2017) [hereinafter 
Future Already Been Forgotten?].  
134 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), resolved as moot sub. nom., Baehr v. Miike, 
994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999).  
135 Defense of Marriage Act, P. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996).  
136  This aspect of DOMA’s history re-emerged in presidential politics two decades later. 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Hillary Clinton’s Claim that DOMA Had to be Enacted to Stop an 
Anti-Gay Marriage Amendment to the U. S. Constitution, WASH. POST (Oct. 28, 2015), 
http://tinyurl.com/oc2235p; Amanda Renteria, e-mail dated Oct. 25, 2015, quoted in e-mail 
chain posted at WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/4957 (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2020); Chris Johnson, He Said, She Said, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 30, 2015 at 1.  
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amendments except one: ENDA.137 The resulting votes showed the gulf 
between employment and marriage. DOMA passed 85-14 while ENDA failed 
50-49, meaning over thirty senators voted for both.138 
The deal proved to have long-lasting ramifications not only for 
marriage equality and ENDA but also for the relationship between trans 
people and HRC. The organization came to lean upon the razor-thin failure 
margin of the 1996 ENDA vote as a justification for not altering the LGB-
only ENDA paradigm.139 Many trans activists countered that it had not even 
been a ‘true vote’ but instead merely political theater to create the appearance 
of progress—both for senators who wanted to have it both ways with respect 
to their gay rights record and for HRC itself in the face of a pre-determined 
reality of ENDA not having any chance of being considered by the Newt 
Gingrich-led House.140  
Over a decade passed before ENDA proposals became trans-
inclusive—but the 2007 bill proved to be no more of a “true” inclusive bill 
than what occurred in the Senate in 1996 had been a “true” vote. The bait-
and-switch of 2007 was the last serious consideration of civilian LGBT anti-
discrimination legislation at the federal level.141 A trans-inclusive ENDA did 
pass the Senate in 2013—while Republicans were in firm control of the 
House.142 Similarly, a trans-inclusive, second-generation Equality Act bill 
passed the House in 2019—with Republican control ensuring that the Senate 
is a graveyard for civil rights proposals.143 
The result? When the Missouri Supreme Court issued its R.M.A. 
decision in 2019, federal statutory law was still as free of explicit 
employment anti-discrimination protections for LGBT people as it was when 
Bella Abzug’s first “Equality Act” bill died 45 years earlier. 
                                                 
137 Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in JOHN D’EMILIO, 
WILLIAM B. TURNER AND URVASHI VAID, EDS., CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC 
POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2000), pp. 149, 84-85. The House never took up ENDA for 
consideration in 1996.  
138 104 CONG. REC. S10129 (Sept. 10, 1996) (rollcall vote no. 279 Leg.). 
139 Tracy Baim, HRC: Birch on Trans Issues, OUTLINES, Sept. 1, 1999 at 14.  
140 Vanessa Edwards Foster, More HRC and Trans Issues, OUTLINES, Sept. 22, 1999 at 6.  
141 Future Already Been Forgotten?, supra note 133, at 576–94.  
142 Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. 
143 See generally, EQUALITY ACT, H.R. 5, 116th Cong., 1st Sess. (Rpt. 116–56) (proposed 
amendment to the Civil Rights Act with its 15-employee standard—to include anti-LGBT 
discrimination). 
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In 1993, sexual orientation, defined trans-inclusively, became part of 
the MHRA.144 The bad news for Missouri is that the addition was to 
Minnesota’s MHRA.145 Good news did follow, but not until 1999. A slightly 
modified version of Minnesota’s trans-inclusive definition of sexual 
orientation was added to Missouri’s law governing hate crimes.146 It was at 
this time that efforts began to seek to add a similarly trans-inclusive category 
of sexual orientation to Missouri’s MHRA.147 Here, one must return to bad 
news: no such bill has ever become law. Even worse, the hate crime statute 
has a track record of proving to be impotent in preventing violence against 
trans people.148   
While in law school, future R.M.A. counsel Alex Edelman authored a 
note on MONA, which even by 2011 had suffered through more than a 
decade of legislative indifference. Advocating for that indifference to 
transmute to positive action, Edelman implored, “As long as the existing 
human rights laws fail to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or gender identity, some citizens will continue to live in fear of 
discrimination.”149 
                                                 
144 1993 MINN. LAWS Ch. 22. § 2. 
145 1993 MINN. LAWS Ch. 22. 
146 1999 MO. S. B. 328, relevant definition codified at MO. REV. STAT. 556.061(46) (2019). 
The Missouri trans clause differs from Minnesota’s in that it uses “not traditionally 
associated with one’s gender” rather than “not traditionally associated with one’s biological 
maleness or females.”  MINN. STAT. §363A. 03, subd. 44 (2019). Notably, the Missouri Hate 
Crime bill, as introduced, did use Minnesota’s phraseology. 1999 MO. S. B. 328 (as 
introduced).  
147 See generally, 2000 MO. S. B. 622 (“biological maleness or femaleness”). A decade would 
pass before such proposals would have distinct “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” 
categories. See 2012 MO. S. B. 798; 2012 MO. H. B. 1500.  
148 The murder of trans teen Ally Steinfeld has resulted in two guilty pleas, with a third person 
charged with first degree murder and set to stand trial in 2020—three years after the killing. 
Jackie Rehwald, Ally Steinfeld Case: Third Suspect Pleads Guilty in Texas County 
Transgender Teen Murder Case, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (May 9, 2019), 
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/crime/2019/05/09/trans-teen-ally-steinfeld-
murder-case-girlfriend-briana-calderas/1151486001/. However, the hate crime provision is 
not even available for Missouri prosecutors who might actually want to use it in conjunction 
with a murder charge—something the Steinfeld prosecutor seemed disinclined to even 
consider in the abstract. Max Londberg, Missouri Law Doesn’t Allow Hate Crime Charges 
in Transgender Teen’s Brutal Slaying, KANSAS CITY STAR (Oct. 4, 2017, 9:40 AM), 
https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/crime/article176919421.html. Adding insult to the 
dead, the other charges in the killing—armed criminal action, abandonment of a corpse and 
tampering with physical evidence—also fell outside of the purview of hate crime 
enhancement.  Rehwald, supra.  
149 Edelman, supra note 121, at 741.  
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Edelman offered a primer on the mechanics of bringing a complaint before 
the Missouri Commission on Human Rights.150 He also laid out the specifics 
of what the long-languishing MONA151 would add to the MHRA, including 
language addressing perception of a victim’s relevant traits.152 His article 
went on to highlight developments in federal law—from Price Waterhouse 
through Schroer v. Billington.153 “While this is promising,” Edelman wrote, 
“it is not nearly enough,”154 going on to describe as “Kafkaesque” the 
interplay between potentially viable sex discrimination claims and animus 
toward the uncovered specific characteristics of sexual orientation and gender 
identity that a discriminator could actually use to get away with 
discriminatory activity.155 
 Edelman valiantly argued that enactment of MONA would give 
LGBT Missourians clear recourse against discrimination. “By punishing 
discrimination,” he reasoned, “the government indicates its disapproval of 
that type of discrimination.”156 The converse should be true as well: a 
statement of positivity by the government should connote approval. 
Throughout all of his arguments about why “MONA is right for 
Missouri,”157 including an extensive plea to not view MONA as being 
incompatible with religious rights, nowhere will one find the first plank of 
(LGB)T rights in Missouri: the state’s recognition of transition. “Missouri 
may not seem a likely place to expand the rights of LGBT Americans.”158  It 
might appear a bit more likely—even to the state’s legislators—if the relevant 
audience is presented with the fact that, at least for trans Missourians, the 
process began during Ronald Reagan’s first term as president. 
  
                                                 
150 Id. at 742.  
151 Alex Edelman specifically referenced the 2010 Senate bill. 2010 MO. S. B. 626.  
152 Edelman, supra note 121, at 744–46.  
153 Id. at 746–47 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989); Nichols v. 
Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 
2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008)).  
154 Edelman, supra note 121, at 747. 
155 Id. at 748. 
156 Id. at 749. 
157 Id. at 750–54. 
158 Id. at 756. 
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III. FROM DICTA TO SUBSTANCE 
It seems obvious to the court that if a state permits such a change of sex on 
the birth certificate of a postoperative transsexual, either by statute or 
administrative ruling, then a marriage license, if requested, must issue to 
such a person provided all other statutory requirements are fulfilled.159 
Ohio has never enacted a trans birth certificate statute. However, in 
1987, Stark County Probate Court Judge Denny Clunk offered his thoughts, 
quoted above, on how courts in states that have done so should rule in cases 
involving opposite-sex trans marriages. Opponents of trans rights eagerly cite 
the ultimate negative decision in the case.160 To them, the decision is proof 
that transition recognition is all but alien to American jurisprudence.161 It is 
not alien, but it has been ignored. 
                                                 
159 In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio Probate Ct. Stark Co. 1987).  
160 For court opinions favorably citing Ladrach without noting the pro-trans dicta, see 
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 228-29 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied), cert. 
denied, 531 U. S. 872 (2000);  In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 130 (Kan. 2002); In re Nash and 
Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 and 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Dec. 31, 2003); Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004), rev. denied, 898 
So.2d 80 (2005); Gajovski v. Gajovski, 610 N.E.2d 431, 433 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (non-
trans case but nevertheless uncritically accepting the ultimate outcome of Ladrach). For 
similar citations in scholarly and advocacy settings, see generally Mathew D. Staver, 
Transsexuality and the Binary Divide: Determining Sex Using Objective Criteria, 2 LIB. U. 
L. REV. 459, 464 n.17, 466, 478–79 (2008); Marika E. Kitamura, Once a Woman, Always a 
Man? What Happens to the Children of Transsexual Marriages and Divorces?: The Effects 
of a Transsexual Marriage on Child Custody and Support Proceedings, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD 
& FAM. ADV. 227, 231 (2005); Teresa A. Zakaria, By Any Other Name: Defining Male and 
Female in Marriage Statutes, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 349, 351 (2005). The Ladrach decision 
was also cited against marital equality in litigation not involving trans people. See generally 
Answer Brief of Campaign for California Families on the Merits at 52-52 n.39, In re 
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (No. S147999).  
161 It is worth noting that Staver has, on multiple occasions inaccurately cited pro-transition 
case law for the proposition that transition recognition is a notion alien to the law. Staver, 
supra note 160, at 464 n.17; Answer Brief, supra note 160, at 52 n.39 (each identically 
asserting that M. T. v. J. T., 355 A. 2d 204 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1976) stands for the 
proposition that “male <sic> transsexual who underwent sex-reassignment surgery may not 
be considered female for marital purposes” when in fact the decision validated a marriage 
between a cis male and a trans woman). I cannot determine whether the inaccurate citing was 
intentional, but a decade later Staver and his Liberty Counsel organization were called out 
by the U. S. Supreme Court Clerk’s Office for misgendering case party Gavin Grimm. 
Compare Scott S. Harris (by Denise McNerney) to Mat Staver, letter dated Feb. 24, 2017; 
with Brief of Amici Curiae Dr. Judith Reisman and the Child Protection Institute in Favor of 
Petitioner, Gloucester County Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (No. 16-273).  
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In 1995 Maryland enacted legislation which was not a wholesale 
adoption of the Model Act but was an effort to update its vital statistics 
framework.162 It was an update that included portions of the Model Act, 
among them the transition-recognition subsection.163 Pennsylvania-born 
Janet Heilig Wright attempted to make use of the statute while living in 
Maryland.164 Lower courts said she could not utilize the law but Maryland’s 
highest court, construing the case as presenting primarily a jurisdictional 
question, ruled in her favor. In 2003, Judge Alan Wilner noted both the 
paucity of legislative history for his state’s law as well as an almost non-
existent amount of available history for the language within the Model Act 
itself.165 Almost going—but now not merely in dicta—where Denny Clunk 
had gone in Ladrach a quarter century earlier, Wilner viewed the General 
Assembly’s usage of the transition language as speaking for itself: 
[It] is clear that, in enacting § 4-214(b)(5), the Legislature 
necessarily recognized the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts to 
consider and grant petitions to declare a change in gender; 
indeed, that section could have no other rational meaning.166 
The public policy underlying the 1995 law may have given Maryland courts 
the authority to grant gender change judgments for any Maryland resident 
who so petitions, but the court would not “opine on what the collateral effect 
of any judgment attesting to a change in gender might be.”167 Consequently, 
                                                 
162 1995 MD. LAWS Ch. 97.  
163 MODEL STATE VITAL STATISTICS ACT, §21(d) (U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & 
WELFARE 1992). The language was evident in the bill despite the bill title not directly calling 
attention to it. The committees that heard the bill, however, were made aware of it. Maryland 
General Assembly, House Environmental Matters Comm. Doc. on 1995 H. B. 1068 at 3–4. 
On March 21, the bill passed the House 136-0 (with three delegates not voting and two 
absent). House vote tally, 1995 H. B. 1068 (legislative date March 19, 1995). The 
Environmental Matters Committee vote had been 20-0. Voting Record, H. B. 1068, March 
16, 1995. On April 4 the Senate approved the bill 46-0 with one senator not voting.  Senate 
vote tally, 1995 H. B. 1068 (legislative date April 2, 1995). The Economic and 
Environmental Affairs Committee vote had been 11-0. Voting Record, H. B. 1068, March 
30, 1995. Gov. Parris Glendenning signed the bill into law.  
Bills in 1996 and 1997 to add birth certificate privacy safeguards to the gender transition 
process – as well as to address more specific complaints that certificates amended pursuant 
to the 1995 guidelines looked fake – did not meet with similar success, each dying quickly 
in committee. 1996 MD. H. B. 323; 1997 MD. H. B. 323.  
164 In re Heilig, 816 A. 2d 68, 69 (Md. 2003). 
165 Id. at 82. 
166 Id. at 84 (emphasis added).  
167 Id. at 85. A lengthy footnote noting the differing views in common law-based 
jurisdictions—recognition vs. anti-recognition—ended with the reiteration that, in light of 
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Wilner and his unanimous court still stopped short of fully adopting Clunk’s 
dicta as Maryland law.168 
 “When I argued the Heilig case, the Court inquired about the issue of 
surgery,” attorney Alyson Meiselman recalled. “My reply was the trial court 
never allowed the case to get that far, as to presenting evidence. However, I 
did argue that the change had to have a level of permanency.”169 Opinions 
vary among trans people on that matter, as well as on what constitutes 
sufficient permanence for transition. Thomas Beatie’s pregnancies—after 
having conformed his Hawaii birth certificate to reflect a male identity—
angered and frightened many, but not all, trans people.170 Dean Spade 
declared that Beatie’s legal sex status could not be questioned.171 Yet it was, 
albeit ultimately unsuccessfully. 
When Beatie and his wife sought a divorce in Arizona, a trial court 
judge had trouble fitting a marriage between “a female [Nancy] and a person 
capable of giving birth, who later did so [Thomas]” into Arizona’s definition 
of marriage.172 He impugned the affidavit Thomas had relied upon to secure 
his male Hawaii birth certificate, pointing out not only that it merely indicated 
he had undergone unspecified “surgical procedures.” He also pointed to 
Thomas’s non-disclosure of the retention of his ability to become pregnant.173   
 The court of appeals took a different view and managed to do so 
without questioning Arizona’s constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.174 
                                                 
the case brought by Wright being only a petition for gender change and not a request for a 
marriage license, marriage “is an issue that is not before us in this case and upon which we 
express no opinion. ” Id. at 85–86 n.9.  
Maryland never fell victim to an anti-same-sex marriage constitutional amendment, but it 
had enacted one of the earliest state DOMA laws. 1973 MD. LAWS Ch. 213. Consequently, 
in 1995—as well as at the time of Heilig—sex status for purposes of marriage validity was 
a live issue in the state. And four years after Heilig, Wilner was part of the Court of Appeals 
majority which kept Maryland from joining the list of states that judicially opened marriage 
to same-sex couples. Conaway v. Deane, 932 A. 2d 571 (Md. 2007).  
168 In re Heilig, 816 A. 2d 68, 85 (Md. 2003). 
169 Alyson Meiselman, comment in TransMaryland Facebook group, Sept. 20, 2014 
(accessed Sept. 21, 2014 (on file with author)).  
170 THOMAS BEATIE, LABOR OF LOVE: THE STORY OF ONE MAN'S EXTRAORDINARY 
PREGNANCY (2008), 254; Leigh Smith, Transfags and Bigotry, ENOUGH NON-SENSE (Nov. 
17,  2008,  7:40 PM),   https://web.archive.org/web/20090310113658/http://tgnonsense.word 
press.com/2008/11/17/transfags-and-bigotry/. 
171 Jen Christensen, Trans Positions, ADVOCATE (May 3, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.advocate.com/news/analysis/2008/05/03/trans-positions. 
172 Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754, 756 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014).  
173 Id. at 757.  
174 Id. 
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Judge Kenton Jones examined two of the four oldest transsexual birth 
certificate statutes. Arizona’s own was relevant given the location of the 
divorce action, but Hawaii’s governed Thomas’s identification 
documentation and the validity of the marriage when and where it was 
performed. Both, at relevant times, specified “sex change operation.”  Jones, 
however, observed that the Hawaii statute required: 
[O]nly that an examining physician provide an affidavit, and 
that the affidavit indicate “the birth registrant has had a sex 
change operation and the sex designation on the birth 
registrant's birth certificate is no longer correct.” In 
accordance with [the statute], Thomas provided the State of 
Hawaii with an affidavit from Dr. Brownstein verifying he had 
undergone a sex change operation, as well as extensive 
hormonal and psychological treatment, and that the specific 
procedures and treatment qualified Thomas to be “legally 
considered male.” Therefore, Thomas complied with the 
statute.175 
Jones then compared Hawaii’s legal framework to Arizona’s. Surprisingly, 
he concluded Arizona’s was even more liberal than Hawaii’s. This was based 
primarily on evidentiary niceties; Hawaii required an affidavit, but Arizona 
only required a written statement: 
Arizona’s statute does not require specific surgical procedures 
be undertaken or obligate the applicant to forego procreation. 
As such, the sworn affidavit Thomas presented to the Director 
of the Hawaii Department of Health toward obtaining an 
amended birth certificate also met the requisites of Arizona’s 
own statutory provision.176 
                                                 
175 Id. at 758.  
176 Id. at 759–60. Oddly enough, the two statutes Jones analyzed no longer consisted of their 
original wording. A 2004 rewrite of Arizona’s 1967 statute saw the substitution of “sex 
change operation” for the original “surgical operation.” 2004 ARIZ. LAWS Ch. 117, § 8. 
Hawaii’s statute had undergone a similar revision a quarter century earlier, with “sex change” 
being added to modify “operation.”  1979 HAW. ACTS No. 130. Five years later, the section 
was reorganized, but with the “sex change operation” provision remaining substantively 
unchanged. 1984 HAW. ACTS No. 167. Arguably then, neither change was truly a 
liberalization but instead more of a specification. The initial version of the Hawaii statute, 
from 1973, included separate provisions for where “the sex item on the person’s birth 
certificate was entered incorrectly” and for where “by reason of [an] operation the sex 
designation on such person’s birth record should be changed.” The House Health Committee 
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Consequently, not only was Thomas’s status as a male—and in turn the 
Hawaii marriage—recognized as real but the Arizona divorce action was 
allowed to proceed, demonstrating that even where a trans birth certificate 
specifies surgery, there is more than a little room for disagreement as to what 
qualifies. The Arizona Court of Appeals was clear that, for a trans man, the 
ability to give birth did not legally negate any procedures that may have taken 
place. 
 Notably, Jones made an effort to ensure that a then-recent observation 
by the Chief Judge Michael J. Davis of the District of Minnesota would not 
be as easily ignored and forgotten as Denny Clunk’s Ladrach dicta has been. 
“The only logical reason to allow the sex identified on a person’s original 
birth certificate to be amended,” Davis wrote in 2012 and which Jones quoted 
alongside Clunk, “is to permit that person to actually use the amended 
certificate to establish his or her legal sex for other purposes, such as 
obtaining a driver’s license, passport, or marriage license.”177  
 The only logical interpretation of a state statutorily allowing the sex 
identified on a person’s original birth certificate to be amended is that the sex 
has changed, not just from male to female (or vice versa) for individual trans 
people but for the laws of the states whose legislatures have approved. It is 
all change, and it is all “sex.”  But it should not all be constrained within birth 
certificates. And none of it should ever have been constrained by selectively 
conservative use of dictionaries. But so often it was. 
An important element of the history of the nation’s first trans-
inclusive state civil rights law is an all-but-forgotten vignette of how the 
nation’s first trans-inclusive civil rights city ordinance178 almost was stripped 
of its trans-inclusivity. The scant reporting on the series of events in 1980 
                                                 
report, however, only refers to “corrections,” implying the sort of distinction between trans-
specific statutes and those of the variety that so many courts have refused to interpret in 
transsexuals’ favor. Nevertheless, that could have been only for brevity as the committee 
also seems to have been aware of the sort of concern transsexuals have regarding 
identification documents: “As certified photostatic copies are preferred directly from the 
corrected records, they remain potential sources of embarrassment – particularly in the case 
of changed father’s name, previously incorrectly designated sex, etc.” 1973 HAW. S. C. REP. 
432 on H. B. 154, reprinted at 1973 HAW. HOUSE J. 939.  
177 Beatie v. Beatie, 333 P.3d 754, 760 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Radtke v. 
Miscellaneous Drivers & Helpers Union Local No. 638 Health, Welfare, Eye & Dental Fund, 
867 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1034 (D. Minn. 2012)).  
178 MINNEAPOLIS ORD. of Dec. 30, 1975, pp. 1216-37, amending MINNEAPOLIS ORD. of 
March 29, 1974.  
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which almost led to revising the 1975 ordinance in a manner that would have 
left its key suspect class category definition without its trans clause179 offered 
much evidence of finger-pointing regarding who was or was not to blame for 
a draft re-write that did not contain trans-inclusive language. That reporting, 
however, serves up no conclusive answer, either as to who or as to why. It 
may have been an intentional attempt to erase the trans stain from one of the 
nation’s earliest gay rights laws while no one was paying close attention. Or 
it may have been merely a benign, albeit misguided, attempt to make the 
wording of the ordinance better. It may even have been mere laziness or 
sloppiness on the part of whoever provided copies of the ordinance180 to those 
intending to draft new language.181 Ultimately, the 1975 incarnation of the 
Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance survived intact and served as a trans-
inclusive model when Minnesota enacted a statewide measure in 1993. No 
erasure occurred, but the eraser was there for the using. 
Judicial reliance upon dictionaries to maintain trans people’s position 
as strangers to remedial law could merely be evidence of laziness. Reliance 
on dictionaries to prop up the constrictive imaginary of a past that likely never 
existed is at best symptomatic of a cowardice that fails not merely trans 
people but society as a whole. At worst, it evidences blatant bigotry. The real 
history of the trans law that already exists, though not erased in the strictest 
sense, is obscured from the view of those who have a right to know about it 
by those who have an obligation to, at the very least, acknowledge its 
existence. The real lives of real people become lost in a never-ending debate. 
Do dictionaries define the world in which people exist?  Or do people and 
their lives define what is real, with dictionaries merely being lexicological 
scriveners of that reality? And if not people and their lives, what about their 
pets? 
 Not until March 2019 did the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) deem 
the modern incarnation of the word “puggle”—describing a breed of dog that 
                                                 
179 Wording that, a generation later, found its way into Missouri’s hate crime law.  
180 Bear in mind that this was long before the everyday lives of legal professionals included 
Westlaw, LEXIS or what we know today as the internet. One professed excuse for the wrong 
language coming into play was the City of Minneapolis providing an out-of-date hardcopy 
of the ordinance language to someone involved with the revision effort.  
181 Katrina C. Rose, Reflections at the Silver Anniversary of the First Trans-Inclusive Gay 
Rights Statute: Ruminations on the Law and its History—and Why Both Should be Defended 
in an Era of Anti-Trans ‘Bathroom Bills,’ 14 U. MASS. L. REV. 70, 99-101 (2019) [hereinafter 
Reflections]. 
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is a cross between a pug and a beagle—to be sufficiently legitimate for 
inclusion. The announcement of this addition (among many others) to the 
OED included an acknowledgement of at least some familiarity with that 
incarnation of “puggle” from as early as 2002.182 But given that the OED’s 
2002 reference source is a Wisconsin State Journal classified ad for puggle 
pups,183 one should be willing to presume that, well before 2002, plenty of 
encounters between pugs and beagles resulted in puppies. Did humans have 
a dictionary-mandated responsibility to wrongly tell those resultant puggles 
that they did not actually exist?184 
 The gap between that 2002 Wisconsin State Journal classified ad and 
the addition of “puggle” to the OED was 17 years. Over the course of 
travelling 17 times ‘round the seasons185 I was born, and I completed 
elementary, junior high, and all but my final semester of high school. At the 
beginning of that journey, Lyndon Johnson was president; at the end, Ronald 
Reagan. In between, I came to terms with who I am; through mainstream 
news sources I learned I was not alone—even in Houston, Texas.186 
During the 17 years preceding the Iowa Supreme Court’s declaration 
in Sommers that “by proscribing discrimination on account of sex the 
legislature did not intend that the term would include transsexuals,”187 
Sixteen American state-level jurisdictions enacted legislation recognizing 
change of sex.188 Iowa was one of those. But its own high court affirmed a 
                                                 
182 Johnathan Dent, New Words in the OED: March 2019, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(BLOG), March 18, 2019, https://public.oed.com/blog/new-words-in-the-oed-march-2019/.  
183 Puggle, n.2,   OXFORD    ENGLISH    DICTIONARY,    https://www.oed. com/view/Entry/ 
78414912.  
184 Full disclosure: I have never owned a puggle. However, during a portion of my doctoral 
studies, some research from which I have utilized in this Article, two pugs were part of my 
family. Rose, Forgotten Paths, supra note 45, at vii.  
185 Apologies to Joni Mitchell, The Circle Game, on LADIES OF THE CANYON (Reprise 1970).  
186 Long before I became aware of how close she came to being the first trans litigant to have 
a case heard by the U. S. Supreme Court, Mayes v. Texas, 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denial of 
certiorari, Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial), I was aware of Ann Mayes via frequent 
mainstream news coverage. See generally, Phil Hevenee, Whatever Happened to Toni Mayes 
After He <sic> Became Ann Mayes?, HOUSTON POST, April 1, 1978. This is in addition to 
my becoming aware of an athlete via her attaining cultural ubiquity in 1976—not Caitlyn 
Jenner, but Renee Richards. See generally Ray Kennedy, She’d Rather Switch—And Fight, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 6, 1976 at 17–19.  
187  Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Iowa 1983) (No. 2-
68164). 
188 Arizona (1967), Louisiana (1968), Hawaii (1973), Utah and North Carolina (both 1975), 
Iowa (1976), California (1977), Michigan (1978), Virginia (1979), Guam (1980), Arkansas, 
D. C. , Massachusetts, New Mexico and Oregon (all 1981) and Georgia (1982). These 16 are 
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trial court decision that rested entirely on a dictionary definition of “sex,”189 
falling back upon the already-lengthy string of anti-trans Title VII 
decisions190 even while crowing about Iowa civil rights law not being bound 
by federal limitations.191 When the trial court concluded that “the word or 
term ‘sex’ must be construed according to its accepted usage,”192 the 1976 
Iowa statute memorializing the Iowa Legislature’s acceptance of the reality 
of change of sex should have been front-and-center. However, it was nowhere 
to be found. Not only was the question of whether that acceptance by the 
Iowa Legislature had an effect on state sex discrimination law left 
unanswered by Sommers; it was never even asked.193   
                                                 
in addition to the 1955 Illinois statute. For an examination of the extent to which this body 
of pro-transsexual law went unnoticed in the late 1970s and early 1980s even in pro-civil 
rights circles, see Reflections, supra note 181, at 130 n.328 (2019). For one of the only other 
analyses of how the body of trans-positive birth certificate statutes came to be, see Jami K. 
Taylor, Barry L. Tadlock, and Sarah Poggione, State LGBT Rights Politics Outliers: 
Transsexual Birth Certificate Laws, 34 AM. REV. OF POLITICS 245 (2013) (attempting to 
provide a cohesive political science explanation for why certain states enacted such statutes).  
189  The trial court judge, Dick Strickler, did not provide a citation to the specific dictionary 
from which he quoted. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, No. CL-38-21968 at 1 (Iowa 
Dist. Ct. Polk Cty. Jan. 14, 1982) (“Either of two divisions or organisms distinguished 
respectfully as male or female; the sum of the structural, functional and behavioral 
peculiarities of living beings that subserve reproduction by two inneracting <sic> parents 
and distinguish male from female. ”).  
190  Though noting the early favorable result in Karen Ulane’s suit E. Airlines, Inc., 81 C 
4411, 1982 WL 31020 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1982), the Iowa Supreme Court uncritically relied 
upon Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read’s, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369 (D. 
Md. 1977); and Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Ca1. 
1975), aff’d. without op., 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978). Sommers, 337 N.W.2d at 474.  
191  Id. (citing Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 
1978)).  
192  Sommers, No. CL-38-21968 at 1 (emphasis added).  
193 And, by this, I mean the birth certificate statute was nowhere to be found in the litigation. 
During the course of my doctoral studies I reviewed the documents on file at the Polk County 
Courthouse and at the State Historical Society of Iowa, both in Des Moines. This is inclusive 
of copies of Audra Sommers’ complaints to the Iowa Civil Rights Commission in 1980 up 
through the decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in 1983 (with the high court’s original 
opinion, see supra note 20, seeming to be the only missing document). None of the 
documents indicate that anyone on either side – plaintiff, defense or the judiciary – even 
knew of the existence of the 1976 birth certificate statute. Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber 
Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in the Quest for the Federal Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 397, 450 (2009) [hereinafter Left the 
Road]. Though I do have trouble believing that no one actually was aware of it; the absence 
should be viewed as stronger evidence that no one viewed it as relevant to the operation of 
the word “sex” in Iowa law. That, in turn, should not be viewed as evidence that it indeed 
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In 2009, as a preface to its pro-marriage equality Varnum v. Brien 
decision, the Iowa high court proudly and validly recounted the state’s record 
of civil rights advances that can be found in its history of decision-making, 
dating back as far as the first opinion ever issued by the court,194 a runaway 
slave case with a positive outcome for that runaway slave.195 Sommers was 
not among the civil rights triumphs cited in Varnum. Nor was it the case cited 
in the court’s mea culpa footnote acknowledging that it has not always “been 
at the forefront in recognizing civil rights in all areas and at all times.”196 In 
2019, had the Iowa Legislature completely dispensed with gender identity 
protections in the Iowa Civil Rights Act instead of merely preventing future 
cases such as Good, then the 1983 Sommers decision would have reasserted 
itself as governing civil rights precedent under Iowa law. 
If by 1983, instead of recognizing transition, Iowa and 16 other state-
level jurisdictions had opted explicitly to ban reflecting transition on birth 
certificates and only one (for hypothetical purposes, let us say Tennessee) 
had chosen the recognition route,197 it seems highly likely that the Iowa 
Supreme Court would have made some reference to what would have been a 
clear negative legislative statement by the state against the underlying 
concept of transsexuality to rationalize its decision to shut Audra Sommers 
(and all transsexuals) out of Iowa sex discrimination protections.  
                                                 
has no such relevance but, instead, that everyone involved failed not just Audra Sommers 
but all trans people.  
194 Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 877 (Iowa 2009) (citing In re Ralph, 1 Morris 1 (Iowa 
1839); Clark v. Board of Dirs., 24 Iowa 266 (1868); Coger v. North West. Union Packet Co., 
37 Iowa 145 (1873)).  
195 As if to anticipatorily contradict Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U. S. 393 (1857), the Iowa 
court surmised, “Property, in the slave, cannot exist without the existence of slavery; the 
prohibition of the latter annihilates the former, and, this being destroyed, he becomes free.”  
Ralph, 1 Morris at 13. For more on the case, see John C. Parish, An Early Fugitive Slave 
Case West of the Mississippi River, 6 IOWA J. HIST. L. & POL. 94 (1908).  
196 Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 877 n.4 (citing In re Carragher, 128 N.W. 352, 354 (1910) 
(upholding certain sex-based occupational distinctions)). Oddly enough, despite no trans 
litigants being involved in Varnum, the court did mention the trans birth certificate statute—
but only as part of its discussion of the immutability of sexual orientation. Id. at 893.  
197  This is, of course, the converse of the 1983 status quo. Tennessee was, and still is, the 
only state to legislatively travel the explicit anti-recognition path. 1977 TENN. ACTS Ch. 128. 
See also 2014 TENN. A.G. OP. No. 14-70 (surmising that the existence of the state’s anti-
trans birth certificate statute would operate to preclude conforming a person’s sex 
designation to post-transition reality on existing police booking sheets, warrants, and court 
records in Tennessee).  
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Equally likely, the following year, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
would have acted similarly. Judge Harlington Wood would not have blithely 
dismissed what would have been Karen Ulane’s inability to obtain a 
conformed Illinois birth certificate. In the Ulane v. Eastern Airlines opinion 
he actually authored, he refused to ascribe any significance to the conformed 
birth certificate itself198 or to even overtly acknowledge that the state in which 
his court sits then recognized transition (much less that it was the first state 
to enact a statute that would do so.199)  Of course, state law would not trump 
federal law, but it can certainly play an evidentiary role in determining what 
Congress could have intended.200 Moreover, acknowledgment of it might 
have yielded an opinion which, as an element of live litigation, would have 
been no more favorable to plaintiff Karen Ulane than the Ulane v. Eastern 
Airlines opinion we all know, but as a judicial and historical artifact three-
and-a-half decades on would not provoke readers otherwise not prone to 
hyperbole to place it in the same league of dishonor as Bowers v. Hardwick,201 
Plessy v. Ferguson202 and Dred Scott v. Sandford.203 
Prof. William Eskridge has made the case for dictionaries serving the 
expansive cause as to the question of the meaning of “sex” as utilized by 
Congress in 1964 for Title VII. There was no unanimity among contemporary 
mainstream dictionaries, and certainly not unanimity in favor of anti-
transgender (and anti-LGB) interpretations of “sex.” Some did indeed go well 
                                                 
198 Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083.  
199  See Katie D. Fletcher, In re Simmons: A Case for Transsexual Marriage Recognition, 37 
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 533, 554–55 (2006).  
200  Or not intended. The Supreme Court never had the opportunity to rule on the question, 
but there was administrative precedent holding that Congress’s complete failure to discuss 
how the federal Defense of Marriage Act would operate with respect to heterosexual 
marriages involving trans people should not inherently operate to the disadvantage of trans 
people.  
[I]t is notable that Congress did not mention the case of M. T. v. J. T., 
which recognized a transsexual marriage. Nor did it mention the various 
State statutes that at the time of consideration of the DOMA provided 
for the legal recognition of a change of sex designation by postoperative 
transsexuals. Rather, Congress’s focus, as indicated by its consistent 
reference to homosexuals in the floor discussions and in the House 
Report, was fixed on, and limited to, the issue of homosexual marriage.  
In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I&N Dec. 746, 749–50 (BIA 2005) (omitting citation and footnote).  
201  478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
202  163 U.S. 537 (1896).  
203  60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
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beyond the biological binary.204 Yet, well after Ulane, dictionaries were used 
as weapons against transsexuals in areas of the law far beyond Title VII.205 
In the 2019 Supreme Court Title VII cases, there will be two primary 
brands of weaponry: an arsenal of dictionaries and the legislative history of 
Title VII. History in a broader sense stands poised to be either victor or 
victim, and locked arm-in-arm with whichever position prevails will be trans 
people.206 Professor Christopher Leslie has highlighted the degree to which 
history was victimized even while those seeking marriage equality prevailed 
in Obergefell v. Hodges. “Collectively,” Leslie wrote, “the Obergefell 
dissenters have valiantly tried to rewrite America’s legal, constitutional, and 
social history, all in an attempt to justify denying civil rights to same-sex 
couples.”207 He branded the dissents as “false narratives”208 Are trans people 
mere months away from being on the short end of the next batch of false 
narratives?  If so, will they be majorities rather than dissents? 
Though the situation is improving, so much of the scholarship on trans 
law is riddled with omissions and inaccuracies.209 However, it is disturbing 
                                                 
204 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338–39 (2017) (pointing to 
the dictionaries as part of a discussion of Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 853 F.3d 
339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc)); see also Brief of William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Andrew M. 
Koppelman as Amici Curiae in Support of Employers, Bostick v. Clayton County, Ga. at 20–
21 (U.S. filed July 3, 2019) (Nos. 17-1618, 17-1623 and 18-107).  
205 See In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 135 (Kan. 2002); In re Nash and Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149 
and 2002-T-0179, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6513 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2003).  
206 This should not be read as dismissive the potential impact on cis LGBs from Bostock v. 
Clayton County and Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda should they result in negative decisions 
from Supreme Court. However, in light of (1) the degree to which the very existence in the 
law of trans people could be impacted negatively by Harris and (2) the long history of certain 
corners of LGB rights advocacy demanding that trans people rely solely expansive readings 
of Title VII to the exclusion of being included in federal civil rights bills, it is fair to assert 
that trans people have much more skin in this particular game.  
207 Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from History: The False Narratives of the Obergefell 
Dissenters, 92 IND. L.J. 1007 (2017).  
208 Id.  
209 Published work in other fields can be even worse. For example, an extensive three-volume 
set marketed as satisfying the requirements and goals of California’s Fair, Accurate, 
Inclusive, and Respectful (FAIR) Education Act, 2011 CAL. LAWS ch. 81, is, in its state-by-
state analysis, severely deficient as to transgender history and law. Its chapter on Colorado 
wholly omits that state’s laws related to transition recognition. Mary Jo Wiatrak-Uhlenkott, 
Colorado, in CHUCK STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE: PEOPLE, ISSUES, AND DOCUMENTS 
OF THE LGBT EXPERIENCE (2014), 855, 899 (“Colorado does not currently have laws 
expressly related to gender change on state ID”). Missouri’s does mention that state’s birth 
certificate statute but offers no insight as to its vintage. Though it does mention J. L. S. v. D. 
K. S., it omits the St. Louis anti-crossdressing ordinance and inaccurately asserts that the 
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that in 2015 a law review article could be published asserting that Virginia 
was in 2002 the first state to allow trans birth certificate amendments without 
a surgery requirement.210 This erased not only the fact that Iowa211 (and 
possibly Utah212) had done so a quarter-century earlier but that Virginia’s 
statute, surgery-specific though it may be, was enacted during the same era,213 
an era when the only detectable success of the increasingly professionalized 
gay rights movement was the construction of the myth, still believed in some 
circles,214 that trans people are legally and politically untouchable. 
Amid the emerging transgender scholarship, a simple question arose 
regarding the trans community’s ability to secure surprising “political and 
policy victories against the odds.” That question is, “[h]ow are they doing 
                                                 
trans-inclusive hate crime statute was initially gay-only and at thereafter became trans-
inclusive. Vanessa Campagna, Missouri, in STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 1039–
47. The single paragraph on identification law in Iowa’s chapter essentially restates the 
wording of the birth certificate statute, but with no indication that it came into being before 
the state repealed its sodomy statute. The chapter does chide the state’s hate crime statute for 
not being trans-inclusive, but again, without any indication of its vintage. Adam Foley, Iowa, 
in STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 964–71. Similarly, the author of the chapter on 
Michigan quotes directly from that state’s birth certificate statute but says nothing about it 
having been enacted in 1978. Karyl E. Ketchum, Michigan, in STEWART, ED., PROUD 
HERITAGE, supra at 1013, 1018. It is also worth noting that the chapter on Nebraska, though 
it does mention the state’s birth certificate statute, contains no mention of the murder of 
Brandon Teena in its section on the state’s LGBT history. Pat Tetrault, Nebraska, in 
STEWART, ED., PROUD HERITAGE, supra at 1055–68. For the marketing of the book, see 
Proud Heritage: People, Issues, and Documents of the LGBT Experience, ABC-CLIO (Dec. 
2014), https://www.abc-clio.com/ABC-CLIOCorporate/product.aspx?pc=A4094C.  
210 Nancie Palmer, et. al., Identity: Societal and Legal Ramifications With Special Focus on 
Transsexuals, 39 NOVA L. REV. 117, 147 (2015) (“Virginia was the first state that allowed 
birth certificate amendments to a trans person’s proper gender without requiring sex-
reassignment surgery”).  
211 1976 IOWA ACTS ch. 1111, § 1 (denoting “surgery or other treatment”).  
212 1975 UTAH LAWS ch. 64, § 1 (utilizing the term “sex change” but not spelling out what 
degree of medical involvement would suffice).  
213 1979 VA. ACTS ch. 711.  
214 The belief carried powerful weight a decade ago during the last serious attempt to enact 
federal LGB(T) rights legislation. See generally Left the Road, supra note 193; ISAAC WEST, 
TRANSFORMING CITIZENSHIPS: TRANSGENDER ARTICULATIONS OF THE LAW 129–62 (2014). 
Some feel that, despite rhetoric of inclusion, the belief has not gone away and will again play 
a destructive role should the shifting winds of D.C. politics makes LGB(T) rights legislation 
viable again. Matthew S. Bajko, With Time, Ire Over Pelosi’s ENDA Stance Fades, BAY 
AREA REP., June 27, 2019 at 26 (quoting trans activist Gwen Smith contrasting House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s opposition to trans-inclusion in the 2007 ENDA bill with her 
acceptance of it in the Equality Act bill in 2019 by asserting that the latter was “easy, because 
she knows it is going nowhere in the Senate. I think we’d see her true colors if something 
was actually on the line”).  
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that?”215 The sad truth is that it is not always clear. Part II of this article 
certainly would have benefited from evidence of the same level of active 
engagement by trans Missourians with their state’s legislative process in 1984 
as exists regarding New Jersey’s original trans birth certificate statute,216 
enacted later that same year.217  It may have occurred, but at present it has 
eluded the historical recovery process. 
What sadly is clear is that one of the “odds” that trans people have 
had to overcome in achieving progress now is a lack of willingness to 
acknowledge progress of the past.218  Sometimes this acknowledgement, 
when it does occur, is quite perverse. No one can credibly argue that, if North 
Carolina had not, in 2016, already had a transsexual birth certificate, it would 
have even considered enacting one in the first instance. But the then-41-year-
old provision was a part of North Carolina’s legal fabric. The wave of anti-
trans animosity in 2016 did lead the state’s General Assembly to not only 
nullify a Charlotte civil rights ordinance219 but also to more broadly gut civil 
rights laws.220  But the infamous H.B.2 did not contain an exclamation point 
                                                 
215 JAMI K. TAYLOR, DANIEL C. LEWIS, AND DONALD P. HAIDER-MARKEL, THE 
REMARKABLE RISE OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 295 (2018).  
216 1984 N.J. Pub. L. ch. 191. This surgery-privileging statute was recently superseded by a 
more modern, non-surgery-specific one. Babs Siperstein Law, 2018 N.J. Pub. L. ch. 58.  
217 Records indicate that the bill was sponsored at the urging of a New Jersey-born trans 
woman then living in D. C. She played a major role in arranging for letters of support for the 
bill from professionals in the trans community and allies. W. Cary Edwards, et. al., to Gov. 
Thomas H. Kean, Executive Office Inter-Communication dated Nov. 5, 1984, Gov. Thomas 
H. Kean, Counsel’s Office: Bill Files for the 1984–1985 Legislative Session, S54CO002, 
Box 31, File S. 1386, New Jersey State Archives, Trenton, New Jersey.  
218 See generally, Reflections, supra note 181, at 124–38. An example from within the world 
of activism can be found in how the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), during a time of major 
tension between establishment-centric gay organizations (such as HRC) and the trans 
community over the viability of inclusion in federal civil rights legislation, misrepresented 
the 1979 Los Angeles Civil Rights Ordinance as being non-inclusive even in 2002 when in 
fact it had been trans-inclusive from day one. Human Rights Campaign, Los Angeles, City 
of,  CA,  HRC WORKNET,   http://www.hrc.org/worknet/asp_search/results.asp?skey=sDetail 
&id=302 (printout dated Nov. 13, 2002, in possession of author) (URL no longer active); 
HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, Jurisdictions that Prohibit Employment Discrimination Based 
on Gender Identity, Characteristics or Expression, HRC WORKNET, http://www. 
hrc.org/worknet/asp_search/results_covered.asp?W=2 (printout dated Nov. 13, 2001, in 
possession of author) (URL no longer active).  
219 CITY OF CHARLOTTE ORD. 7056 (enacted Feb. 22, 2016).  
220 2016 N.C. LAWS ch. 3 (2nd Ex. Sess.), since partially revised, 2017 N.C. LAWS ch. 4. See 
also Dominic Holden, North Carolina Enacts Law to Allow LGBT Discrimination, 
BUZZFEED   (last  updated   Mar.  24,  2016,   12:20 AM),   https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ 
article/dominicholden/north-carolina-lgbt-discrimintion.  
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converting North Carolina’s 1975 pro-transsexual birth certificate statute to 
a Tennessee-style anti-transsexual birth certificate statute. The 1975 pro-trans 
law was even relied upon by 21st century opponents of trans rights during the 
state’s nearly-instantaneous proposal and passage of H.B. 2 as a means to 
paint that bill as reasonable.221 The same Republican super-majority and the 
same Republican governor who quickly made H.B. 2 part of the law of North 
Carolina could have wiped out the state’s recognition of transition. But they 
did not. 
Professor Eskridge and Professor John Ferejohn identify a “super-
statute” as: 
[A] law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new 
normative or institutional framework for state policy and (2) 
over time does “stick” in the public culture such that (3) the 
super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have 
a broad effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four 
corners of the statute.222 
One could argue that the events of 2016 are evidence that the 1975 
transsexual birth certificate statute, at least to some degree, established a new 
normative framework for state policy (in that it recognized surgical 
transition). In addition, it had become firmly rooted in the public culture in 
that even anti-LGBT politicians impliedly professed approval of it, albeit 
disingenuously for the purpose of enacting anti-civil rights legislation. Yet it 
would be hyperbolic—in fact, bordering on silly—to argue that transsexual 
birth certificate statutes are the caliber of “super-statute” of which Eskridge 
and Ferejohn wrote.223   
They are, however, neither “legislative compromises that are short-
term fixes to bigger problems and cannot easily be defended as the best policy 
result that can be achieved” nor even, despite seemingly dealing with but a 
single word, statutes that “cover narrow subject areas.”224  For trans people, 
if they are not super-statutes per se, then they are specialized super-statutes. 
                                                 
221 See generally, House Floor Debate on H.B. 2, N.C. General Assembly, March 23, 2016, 
audio available at https://www.ncleg.gov/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2015-2016%20 
Session/Audio%20Archives/2016/03-23-2016.mp3 (last visited Aug. 6, 2019).  
222 William N. Eskridge, Jr., & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).  
223 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is but one of their examples of “super-statutes.”  Id. at 1237.     
224 Id. at 1215 (offering the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-24, 97 
Stat. 175 (1983); Hawaii Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, 1997 HAW ACTS Ch. 383 as statutes 
that are not super).  
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That is how they are used in everyday life by everyday trans people. Improper 
conservative judicial reliance on dictionaries and even a bit of laziness within 
the trans community and among its legal allies in not thinking beyond the 
“four corners” of birth certificate statutory language has been a roadblock to 
them becoming far more in far more jurisdictions than the few that, thus far, 
have opened their eyes to what a state’s transition recognition really means. 
CONCLUSION 
During the heat of the 2012 presidential campaign, the Washington 
Blade ran an opinion piece about the then-current state of trans rights. “Trans 
Americans enjoy robust bias protections,” perennial Maryland legislative 
candidate225 Dana Beyer declared.226  Far from being just an overly optimistic 
analysis of law by a non-attorney, it was a dangerous fit of ill-reasoned 
castigation of a majority of the trans community that was, and still is, 
unwilling to accept smoke and mirrors in place of statutory bedrock. 
“ENDA,” she asserted, was “not a legal necessity today to protect transgender 
Americans” but, instead, merely a “political necessity.”227 
 Criticism of her analysis is not incompatible with advocacy for 
expansive use of trans birth certificate statutes. Yes, there was much to be 
happy about on the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins front in 2012. The 
nightmarish Holloway-Sommers-Ulane triumvirate had been joined on the 
trans legal landscape by decisions such as Schwenk v. Hartford,228 Rosa v. 
                                                 
225 Michael K. Lavers, Jealous Wins Md. Gubernatorial Primary, WASH. BLADE, June 29, 
2018 at 4, 8; Michael K. Lavers, Mizeur Falls Short in Maryland, WASH. BLADE, June 27, 
2014 at 1, 4; Lou Chibbaro, Jr., Dana Beyer to Launch Maryland Delegate Bid, WASH. 
BLADE (June 24, 2010, 2:16 PM), https://www.washingtonblade.com/2010/06/24/dana-
beyer-to-launch-maryland-delegate-bid/.; Will O’Bryan, Political Transition: Democrat 
Dana Beyer Fights to be Maryland’s First Transgender Delegate, METRO WEEKLY (Aug. 9, 
2006), https://www.metroweekly.com/2006/08/political-transition/.  
226 I do understand that authors rarely have full control over the titles of their work once they 
are accepted for print. I’ve had a few columns printed in the Washington Blade; none ran 
with the exact title I’d submitted. Had Beyer not used the key word “robust,” for which I 
have long criticized her column, it would be unfair to attribute that phraseology to her. 
However, that language does appear in the body of the column – arguably with even more 
of a Pollyanna view of the law than the title suggests: “[L]et’s acknowledge and use our 
robust protections, and let’s not promote ignorance because we’re unable to adapt to 
circumstances that have radically changed for the better.” Dana Beyer, Trans Americans 
Enjoy Robust Bias Protections, WASH. BLADE, June 29, 2012 at 21.  
227 Id.  
228 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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Park West Bank,229 Smith v. City of Salem,230 Barnes v. City of Cincinnati231 
and Glenn v. Brumby.232 Joining them that year was Macy v. Holder, the 
EEOC decision formally disavowing the anti-trans view of Title VII and 
specifically conceding “that intentional discrimination against a transgender 
individual because that person is transgender is, by definition, discrimination 
‘based on…sex,’ and such discrimination violates Title VII.”233 
 Schwenk, Rosa, Smith, Barnes, Glenn, and Macy all joined the old 
triumvirate; nothing truly replaced it, even in circuits that adopted Price 
Waterhouse-centric reasoning. With top LGB powerbrokers having long 
before decided that marriage equality was the agenda item, any chance 
whatsoever of ENDA becoming law had died during the first biennium of the 
Obama Administration.234 While it lay dead in Congress, Title VII still only 
said “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”235   
 There was no “sexual orientation.” And there was no “gender identity 
or expression.” And then came the Trump Administration.  
LGBT America spent much of the summer and early fall of 2018 
concerned about the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, both because of his past236 and because of what a future with him on 
the high court might bring.237 Well before Kavanaugh was nominated, the 
high court had dodged Gavin Grimm’s case.238 But with Kavanaugh on the 
Court as the replacement for Anthony Kennedy, on April 22, 2019, the Court 
granted certiorari in Harris Funeral Homes v. EEOC on the specific questions 
of whether Title VII covers trans people per se and whether it covers trans 
people via the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping theory.239 
 The case originated in Michigan.240  Much like Missouri of today and 
Iowa of 1983, Michigan is a state that has a sex discrimination statute and a 
                                                 
229 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000).  
230 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).  
231 401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005).  
232 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011).  
233 App. No. 0120120821, Agency No. ATF-2011-00751 at *14 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).  
234 Future Already Been Forgotten?, supra note 133, at 576–94.  
235 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S §2000e.  
236 Peter Rosenstein, Will the Senate Confirm a Lying Sleazebag?, WASH. BLADE, Oct. 5, 
2018 at 19.  
237 Kathi Wolfe, Be Afraid, Be Very Afraid, of Brett Kavanaugh, WASH. BLADE, July 13, 
2018 at 18.  
238 Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G. G., 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017).  
239 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019).  
240 EEOC v. R. G. & G. R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F. 3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018).  
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transsexual birth certificate statute. However, it does not have a specifically-
enumerated statutory avenue for trans people to seek redress for bigotry that 
impedes their ability to find and maintain employment and housing as well 
as to access public accommodations on the same terms as all others. A 
Kavanaugh-infused Supreme Court could rule against the tapestry of trans-
inclusive interpretations of federal law that trans people have, largely on an 
ad hoc basis, used in recent years. Despite that tapestry being anything but 
“robust,” in many instances, trans people have been told by cis gay power 
brokers to rely on it to the exclusive consideration of adding trans protections 
to LGB-only bills,241 notably the pre-2007 ENDA proposals.242 If that 
tapestry disintegrates from merely not robust to wholly non-existent,243 trans 
people will need to know as much as we can about what we have to fall back 
on. Those who might be handling such cases need to know as well. 
 And so do those who will be deciding the cases. But the outlook for 
accurate decision-making is grim in a world where a federal appellate court 
can, in 2019, issue an opinion that can cause an observer to sincerely question 
whether it knows the difference between sexual orientation and gender 
identity or the history of the terms being defined to mutually exclude one 
another.244 No precedent that rests on the demonstrably inaccurate 
                                                 
241 See Cathy Brennan, Grave Disservice, WASH. BLADE, Jan. 5, 2001 at 27; Cathy Brennan, 
Banning Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation: A Primer on Maryland’s New Civil 
Rights Law, MD. BAR J., May–June 2002, at 50, 53–54 (touting the state’s 2001 gay-only 
rights law and leaving Price Waterhouse for trans people as an “emerging legal theor[y],” 
taking up where the 2001 Washington Blade item, from prior to the bill’s passage, left off).  
242 This is in addition to the overly optimistic assessments of Beyer and those of like mind. 
Katrina C. Rose, Three Names in Ohio: In re Bicknell, In re Maloney and Hope for 
Recognition that the Gay-Transgender Twain Has Met, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 89, 99 n.46 
(2002) (citing a representative of HRC for a 1999 assertion that the combination of (1) 
whatever may sprout from Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins and (2) the non-inclusive version 
of ENDA that HRC insisted upon up through the ENDA Crisis of 2007 as combining to leave 
no possibility that any trans person would not be covered by federal law).  
243 Arianne Cohen, The Trump Administration is Canceling LGBTQ People on Government 
Websites, Fast Company (Nov. 21, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90434456/the-
trump-administration-is-canceling-lgbtq-people-on-government-websites (noting that the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention replaced “LGBTQ” with “LGB” on pages about 
queer youth, while also deleting certain transgender statistics). 
244 In Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., 304 F. Supp. 3d 627, 634 (S. D. Tex. 2018), the district 
court stated that the Fifth Circuit had not yet addressed the question of whether Title VII 
encompassed transgender discrimination. However, Judge Ho of the Fifth Circuit countered 
that “we have addressed the issue. In Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979), 
we expressly held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.” 
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presumption that enactment of a gay-only rights bill would have had any 
positive impact on trans people as trans people should have any force today. 
Yet it does. 
 Even in a trans-friendly Harris ruling, it seems unlikely that the high 
court or even those arguing the case will delve into the still-largely-untapped 
wealth of state trans law. A trans-averse ruling will leave all trans people in 
Michigan in the position of needing an alternative to Title VII, an alternative 
that seems unlikely to emerge at the federal level any time soon, even if a 
Democrat enters the White House in 2021. They will need to make arguments 
based on their own state’s law. Michigan’s legal framework contains the 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA)245 and a trans birth certificate 
statute, enacted two years apart.246  
 The concept of interpreting the “sex” ELCRA provision to include 
trans people is not unheard of. When Michigan’s civil rights agency decided 
to do so (along with interpreting it to include sexual orientation),247 the 
decision was not without pushback. Republican Attorney General Bill 
Schuette quickly issued an opinion as dictionary reliant as the R.M.A. dissent. 
Absent, though, was any mention of the Michigan Legislature having altered 
the legal paradigm of “sex” in a trans-positive manner two years after it 
passed the ELCRA.248  Schuette’s Democratic successor, Dana Nessel, 
adopted the trans-positive view espoused by the civil rights commission,249 
but that is not an ultimate solution. It is merely a pause until the inevitable 
resolution by Michigan’s appellate courts, which have demonstrated a 
willingness to go out of their way to allow a cause of action by cis plaintiffs 
against trans equality.250 
                                                 
245 1976 MICH. ACTS ch. 453, currently codified in relevant part at MICH. STAT. 
§37.2202(1)(a) (2019).  
246 1978 MICH. ACTS. ch. 368, currently codified in relevant part at MICH. STAT. 
§333.2831(c) (2019).  
247 Kristen Jordan Shamus, Equal at Last? Michigan Civil Rights Commission Bans LGBTQ 
Discrimination, DETROIT FREE PRESS (last updated May 22, 2018, 9:48 AM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/05/21/michigan-civil-rights-
commission-elliott-larsen-act-lgbtq-discrimination/630552002/.  
248 2018 MICH. A.G. OP. No. 7305 (July 20, 2018).  
249 Kristen Jordan Shamus, AG Dana Nessel to Reconsider LGBTQ Rights Protections, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (last updated Feb. 2, 2019, 10:13 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/2019/02/01/lgbtq-michigan-civil-rights-law/2743034002/. 
250 Cormier v. PF Fitness-Midland, LLC, 909 N.W.2d 266 (Mich. 2018), rev’d in part, 2017 
Mich. App. LEXIS 893 (Mich. Ct. App. June 1, 2017).  
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 And, riding the pendulum back to the possibility of a positive Harris 
ruling from the Supreme Court, some trans people in Michigan will still need 
to be aware of, and be able to make, an argument for the ELCRA and the 
trans birth certificate statute working in concert to the benefit of trans civil 
rights. For that positive Harris ruling will do nothing for those caught in the 
Michigan analogue of the gap presented in this Article’s introduction. The 
Missouri Human Rights Act applies to employers of at least six people.251  
The ELCRA, however, encompasses employers of at least one person.252 
 The theory that the Missouri Supreme Court breathed life into via 
R.M.A.’s footnote seven will not be an academic one irrespective of how the 
U.S. Supreme Court rules in Harris. However, a negative outcome will make 
its vitality an imperative not merely for trans people in Missouri and 
Michigan but also for those in Arizona,253 Kentucky,254 Louisiana,255 
Nebraska,256 North Carolina,257 Wisconsin,258 and Virginia.259  The statutory 
framework in each of these states contains a trans birth certificate provision 
as well as one or more provisions prohibiting discrimination based on sex.260  
But each lacks an explicit statutory prohibition against discrimination against 
trans people. Even Wisconsin, almost four decades after it became the first to 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation—defined, of course, to 
                                                 
251 MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(8) (2019).  
252 MICH. STAT. § 333.2831(c) (2019).  
253 ARIZ. STAT. § 36-337(A)(3) (2019); ARIZ. STAT. § 41-1463(B) (2019).  
254 KY. REV. STAT. § 213.121(5) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. § 344.040(1) (2019).  
255 LA. REV. STAT. § 40:62 (2019); LA. REV. STAT. § 23:332 (2019).  
256 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1104 (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (2019).  
257 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-118(b)(4) (2019). North 
Carolina’s sex discrimination law postdates the state’s transsexual birth certificate statute. 
Compare Equal Employment Practices Act, 1977 N.C. LAWS ch. 726; with An Act to Amend 
G. S. 130-60 to Authorize Issuance of a New Birth Certificate After Sex Reassignment 
Surgery, 1975 N.C. LAWS ch. 556.  
258 WIS. STAT. § 111.321 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 69.15(4)(b) (2019).  
259 VA. CODE §2.2-3900, et. seq. (2019); VA. CODE § 32.1-269(E) (2019). It should be noted 
that with the Democratic sweep in its 2019 elections, Virginia may become the next state to 
enact explicit LGBTQ rights legislation. Alex Bollinger, Danica Roem Just Became the First 
Trans Person Reelected to a State Legislature, LGBTQ NATION (Nov. 6, 2019), 
https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2019/11/danica-roem-just-became-first-trans-person-
reelected-state-legislature/; see also 2020 VA. S.B. 868. 
260 The list would also include Alabama and Georgia, each of which has a trans birth 
certificate statute. CODE OF ALA. § 22-9A-19(d) (2019); CODE OF GA. § 31-10-23(e) (2019). 
However, both not only lack sexual orientation and gender identity protections but also lack 
sex discrimination protections.  
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exclude trans people261—leaves those who can use its (or another state’s) 
trans birth certificate statute with no avenue of redress against discrimination. 
This Article has taken a somewhat convoluted route. But it is one 
necessitated by the degree to which the rationale of footnote seven has been 
ignored prior to R.M.A.. Beginning in Iowa, this Article did spend most of its 
time in Missouri, only to conclude in Michigan, all in service of a legal theory 
that should have been self-evident decades ago but which disturbing 
percentages of multiple communities, legal professionals, historians and 
LGB people, still refuse to recognize as even a possibility, much less a reality. 
This Article also undergirds a historico-legal reality that goes much deeper 
than footnote seven: that long before any legislatures seriously considered 
LGB anti-discrimination measures, several not only considered but approved 
of conferring positive legal status upon change of sex.262 That is robust. 
 Those acts of conferring—when and where they happened—did more 
than merely give individual trans people the ability to live life without 
identification documents that would out them at every turn. Contrary to what 
the calcified, minimalistic definitions in the mainstream dictionaries 
selectively relied upon by certain judges say, those legislatures changed 
“sex,”263 even if the dictionaries did not acknowledge it. The birth certificate 
statutes may not rise to the level of “super statutes” as Eskridge and Ferejohn 
envision the term,264 but the thousands upon thousands of trans people who 
have used them might argue differently. For it is impossible to use such a 
statute by only staying within its four corners.265  Anyone who makes such 
four-corner use thereafter goes out into the world. Seeking or attempting to 
maintain employment. Seeking or attempting to maintain housing. Making 
use of any number of public accommodations. 
 With the help of amended/new birth certificates (as well as drivers 
licenses, passports, etc.), it is all done as who they really are while interacting 
                                                 
261 WIS. STAT. § 111.32(13m) (2019) (“[H]aving a preference for heterosexuality, 
homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such a preference or being identified with 
such a preference.”). 
262 See generally, Reflections, supra note 181, at 126–31.  
263 This is not necessarily a theory put forth by Joanne Meyerowitz in her important work on 
the history of transsexuality, but it would be improper not to pay homage to her research. 
JOANNE MEYEROWITZ, HOW SEX CHANGED: A HISTORY OF TRANSSEXUALITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2002).  
264 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 222, at 1215.  
265 Id. at 1216 (“[T]he super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad 
effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four comers of the statute.”).  
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with at least some individuals who, if given absolute power over transition, 
would “mandate it out of existence.”266 
The first trans person to use the first trans birth certificate statute, 
whoever she or he may have been, took that statute beyond its textual four 
corners the instant that that person left the courthouse with a government-
sanctioned change of sex. As the Illinois Supreme Court held in City of 
Chicago v. Wilson, that first statute had legal impact well beyond its four 
corners even for those who had yet to use it.267 There has never been a 
legitimate reason to view the statutory changes that recognize such a core 
aspect of life as transition as not having effect throughout the entirety of the 
body of law of those states which have enacted them. Yet that has rarely 
stopped such erasure from taking place. What stopped the Iowa Supreme 
Court in 1983 from recognizing the effect in Sommers, at least beyond 
conservative inertia, is unclear, though it is clear that no one on either side 
made the argument for it. What is also clear is that, at present, decisions such 
as Wilson and R.M.A. —generations removed from one another—are 
exceptions. Irrespective of how the U.S. Supreme Court rules in Harris, these 
decisions should become the rule. Nevertheless, this Article should not be 
read as offering a prediction as to whether they will. 
                                                 
266 RAYMOND, TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE, supra note 8, at 178.  Raymond is a largely 
discredited, transphobic second-wave feminist.  However, trans-erasive thought has begun 
to creep into the judiciary. See United States v. Varner, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 1346 at *9–
*10 (5th Cir. Jan. 15, 2020) (Duncan, J.) (suggesting strongly that any acknowledgement 
whatsoever of trans litigants’ identities should be considered judicial impartiality that 
prejudices opposing parties). 
267 With state-city pre-emption being the basis for the partial invalidation of Chicago’s anti-
crossdressing ordinance due to the state birth certificate statute, the ordinance should, 
therefore, have been equally invalid, as against a pre-surgical transsexual person, the moment 
that the law took effect in 1955 as it was held to be regarding the Feb. 1974 arrest that set 
the litigation in motion. City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978).  
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APPENDIX A: RELEVANT VOTING RECORDS OF THOSE WHO SERVED IN BOTH 





VOTE ON ADDITION OF “SEX” 
TO IOWA CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: 
1969 H.F. 251 
House floor vote: Feb. 16, 1970 
Senate floor vote: March 25, 1970 
VOTE ON TRANSSEXUAL BIRTH 
CERTIFICATE BILL:  
1975 H.F. 798 
House floor vote: April 28, 1975 
Senate floor vote: Jan. 30, 1976 
Chamber Yes No A/NV Chamber Yes No A/NV 
Leonard C. Andersen House    Senate    
Irvin L. Bergman House    Senate    
Glen E. Bortell Senate    House    
James E. Briles Senate    Senate    
James T. Caffrey House    House    
Dale M. Cochran House    House    
C. Joseph Coleman Senate    Senate    
Frank Crabb Senate    Senate    
Lucas J. DeKoster Senate    Senate    
Elmer H. Den Herder House    House    
Minnette Doderer Senate    Senate    
Donald V. Doyle House    House    
Richard F. Drake House    House    
Keith H. Dunton House    House    
Gene W. Glenn Senate    Senate    
James W. Griffin, Sr. Senate    Senate    
Willard R. Hansen House    Senate    
Eugene M. Hill Senate    Senate    
Norman G. Jesse House    House    
Robert M. Kreamer House    House    
Clifton C. Lamborn Senate    Senate    
James I. Middleswart House    House    
Floyd H. Millen House    House    
Charles P. Miller House    Senate    
Elizabeth R. Miller House    Senate    
Fred W. Nolting House    Senate    
Joan Orr Senate    House    
William D. Palmer Senate    Senate    
Charles N. Poncy House    House    
Berl E. Priebe House    Senate    
W.R. Rabedeaux Senate    Senate    
Norman G. Rodgers Senate    Senate    
Roger J. Shaff Senate    Senate    
Elizabeth Shaw Senate    Senate    
Delwyn Stromer House    House    
Dale L. Tieden Senate    Senate    
Bass Van Gilst Senate    Senate    
Andrew Varley House    House    
Richard W. Welden House    House    
James D. Wells House    House    
William P. Winkelman House    Senate    
TOTALS  36 1 4  30 3 8 
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VOTE(S) ON TRANSSEXUAL 
BIRTH CERTIFICATE BILL: 
1984 S.B. 574 
1st Senate floor vote: Feb. 8th 
House floor vote: April 3rd 
2nd Senate floor vote: April 5th 
VOTE ON MISSOURI HUMAN 
RIGHTS ACT BILL: 
1986 S.B. 513 
1st Senate floor vote: April 2nd 
House floor vote: April 30th 
2nd Senate floor vote: April 30th 
Chamber Yes No A/NV Chamber Yes No A/NV 
Mark C. Abel     House    
G.M. Allen House    House    
Ron Auer House    House    
Gracia Yancey Backer House    House    
J.B. (Jet) Banks Senate       Senate       
Stephen (Steve) 
Banton 
House    House    
Todd Barklage House        
Francis (Bud) Barnes House    House    
Jim Barnes House    House    
Robert (Bob) Barney House    House    
Philip M. Barry House    House    
John F. Bass Senate       Senate       
Richard P. Beard House        
Charles Becker House    House    
Karen McCarthy 
Benson 
House        
Frank Bild Senate       Senate       
Glenn H. Binger House    House    
John A. Birch House    House    
Mary Groves Bland House    House    
Leroy Blunt House    House    
Douglas Boschert     House    
Francis (Fran) R. 
Brady 
House    House    
Larry Braungardt House        
Russell G. Brockfield House    House    
Everett W. Brown House    House    
Galen Browning House    House    
Fred B. Brummel House    House    
Jerry W. Burch House    House    
Flavel J. Butts House    House    
Roy Cagle House    House    
Marion G. Cairns House    House    
E.J. Cantrell House    House    
Steven R. Carroll     House    
Mervin R. Case     House    
Harold L. Caskey Senate       Senate       
Gail L. Chatfield     House    
Doyle Childers House    House    
William (Bill) Clay, 
Jr. 
House    House    
Donna Ann Coleman House        
Bonnie Sue Cooper House    House    
Fred E. (Gene) 
Copeland 
House    House    
Gerald (Jerry) Cox House        
Norwood Creason House    House    






VOTE(S) ON TRANSSEXUAL 
BIRTH CERTIFICATE BILL: 
1984 S.B. 574 
1st Senate floor vote: Feb. 8th 
House floor vote: April 3rd 
2nd Senate floor vote: April 5th 
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RIGHTS ACT BILL: 
1986 S.B. 513 
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House floor vote: April 30th 
2nd Senate floor vote: April 30th 
Chamber Yes No A/NV Chamber Yes No A/NV 
Dewey G. Crump House    House    
Wayne Crump House    House    
Phil B. Curls Senate       Senate       
George P. Dames House    House    
Fletcher Daniels     House    
Mrs. Pat Danner Senate       Senate       
Steve Danner House    House    
Michael P. David House    House    
W.T. (Bill) Dawson House    House    
John Dennis Senate       Senate       
Ronnie DePasco House    House    
Edwin L. Dirck Senate       Senate       
David Doctorian Senate       Senate       
Lorita (Laurie) B. 
Donovan 
House    House    
Patrick Dougherty House    House    
Sam Doutt House    House    
Vic Downing House    House    
Joseph L. (Joe) 
Driskill 
House    House    
Robert L. Dunning, Sr. House    House    
Fred Dyer Senate       Senate       
Charlie Eberspacher     House    
Russ Egan House    House    
Frank C. Ellis House    House    
Harold J. Esser House        
Herb C. Fallert House    House    
Alex J. Fazzino House        
Bob Feigenbaum House    House    
Ken F. Fiebelman     House    
F.A. Findley House    House    
Francis E. Flotron, Jr. House    House    
Louis H. Ford House    House    
Bob Fowler House        
John J. Fowler  House    House    
Estil V. Fretwell House    House    
Donald L. Gann House    House    
Clifford W. (Jack) 
Gannon 
Senate       Senate       
Howard M. Garrett House        
Jack Goldman House    House    
Wayne Goode House    Senate       
Russell Goward House    House    
Christopher Graham House    House    
Bob F. Griffin 
(Speaker) 
House    House    
R.B. Grisham House    House    
Ray Hamlett House    House    
Doug Harpool House    House    
Betty Cooper Hearnes House    House    
Ralph Hedrick House    House    
Patrick J. Hickey House    House    
Harry Hill House    House    
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George K. Hoblitzelle House    House    
Bob Holden House    House    
Derek Holland House    House    
W.O. (Bob) Howard     House    
Mildred Humphreys     House    
Roy Humphreys, Jr. House        
Robert (Bob) Jackson House        
Ken Jacob House    House    
Martha Jarman House    House    
Robert Thane (Bob) 
Johnson 
Senate       Senate       
A. Clifford Jones Senate       Senate       
Orchid (Mrs. Leon) 
Jordan 
House    House    
Mary C. Kasten House    House    
Timothy M. (Tim) 
Kelley 
House    House    
Chris Kelly House    House    
Garnett A. Kelly  House        
Don Koller     House    
Gene Lang House    House    
Ken Legan House    House    
William E. (Bud) 
Lewis 
House    House    
Sheila Lumpe House    House    
Mike Lybyer Senate       Senate       
Fred Lynn House    House    
L.W. (Lew) Maddox  House    House    
W.A. (Bill) Markland House    House    
Gladys Marriott House    House    
T.W. (Tom) Marshall     House    
Jan Martinette     House    
Jean H. Mathews House    House    
James L. (Jim) 
Mathewson 
Senate       Senate       
Jerry E. McBride House    House    
Karen McCarthy     House    
Thomas W. McCarthy Senate       Senate       
Claire McCaskill House    House    
Joe McCracken House    House    
William (Bill) 
McKenna 
House    House    
Nolan G. McNeill House        
Donald R. McQuitty     House    
Emory Melton Senate       Senate       
Norman Merrell Senate       Senate       
Wesley A. Miller House    House    
Jim Mitchell House    House    
Neil Molloy     House    
Marjorie (Jean) 
Montgomery 
    House    
Annette N. Morgan House    House    
Travis Morrison House    House    
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Walt Mueller House    House    
James W. (Jim) 
Murphy 
Senate           
Jim Murphy House    House    
Al Nilges House    House    
W. Eugene Oakley House        
Judith O’Connor House    House    
Matt O’Neill     House    
Joseph R. Ortwerth House    House    
D.R. (Ozzie) Osbourn House        
Lois Osbourn     House    
William R. O’Toole House        
Edward E. Ottinger House    House    
Paul (Pete) Page House    House    
Henry A. Panethiere Senate       Senate       
Carole Roper Park House    House    
Lester R. Patterson House    House    
Jim Pauley House    House    
Walter R. Peterson, Jr. House    House    
Jack E. Pohrer House        
Marvin E. Proffer House    House    
Edward E. Quick     Senate       
William (Bill) Raisch House    House    
Don Randall House        
David L. Rauch House    House    
Sandra Lee Reeves House    House    
Tony Ribaudo House    House    
James N. Riley House    House    
Henry C. Rizzo     House    
Randy Robb House        
Richard (Dick) Roehl House        
Larry Rohrbach House    House    
James (Jay) Russell House    House    
John T. Russell Senate       Senate       
Jeff W. 
Schaeperkoetter 
House    House    
Edward H. Schellhorn     House    
Earl L. Schlef House    House    
John D. Schneider Senate       Senate       
Ed Schwaneke House    House    
David E. Scott House        
Delbert Scott     House    
John E. Scott Senate       Senate       
Vernon E. Scoville House    House    
Robert (Bob) Sego House    House    
Stephen R. Sharp     Senate       
Gary D. Sharpe House        
S. Sue Shear House    House    
O.L. Shelton House    House    
Bill Skaggs House    House    
Dennis Smith Senate       Senate       
James (Jim) Smith House        
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Melvin Smith House    House    
Todd P. Smith     House    
Phil Snowden Senate           
Danny Staples Senate       Senate       
Earle F. Staponski House    House    
David L. Steelman House        
Kaye H. Steinmetz House    House    
Ron Stivison     House    
James R. (Jim) Strong Senate       Senate       
Chuck Surface        House    
James Talent        House    
Lynn Thomas        House    
Nelson B. Tinnin Senate           
Joan T. Tobin     House    
Merrill M. Townley House    House    
Joseph L. Treadway House    House    
Irene Treppler House    Senate       
Charles Quincy 
Troupe 
House    House    
Ralph Uthault, Jr. Senate       Senate       
Thomas Albert Villa House        
Nathan B. Walker House        
Elbert A. Walton, Jr. House    House    
Bob Ward House    House    
Winnie P. Weber House    House    
Richard M. Webster Senate       Senate       
William L. Webster House        
William E. Whitehall House    House    
Harry Wiggins Senate       Senate       
Curtis R. Wilkerson House    House    
Eddie Williams 131     House    
Fred Williams 56 House    House    
Roger B. Wilson 
(Boone) 
Senate       Senate       
Truman E. Wilson 
(Buchanan 
Senate       Senate       
Clarence J. Wohlwend     House    
J. Dan Woodall House    House    
Harriett Woods Senate           
Rex R. Wyrick House    House    
Robert Ellis Young House    House    
Mark A. Youngdahl House    House    
Dennis Ziegenhorn House    House    
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BREAKDOWN OF VOTES 
LEGISLATORS WHO 
SERVED IN THE HOUSE 
DURING BOTH THE 1984 
AND 1986 SESSIONS 
131 OUT OF A 
POSSIBLE 163 
Yes on both bills: 97 
No on both bills: 0 
Absent on both bills: 3 
Yes on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 8 
Yes on BC bill / Absent on MHRA bill: 7 
No on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0 
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 16 
Absent on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 0 
LEGISLATORS WHO 
SERVED IN THE SENATE 
DURING BOTH THE 1984 
AND 1986 SESSIONS 
30 OUT OF A  
POSSIBLE 34 
Yes on both bills: 27 
No on both bills: 0 
Absent on both bills: 0 
Yes on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 2 
Yes on BC bill / Absent on MHRA bill: 1 
No on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0 
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 0 
Absent on BC bill / No on MHRA bill: 0 
LEGISLATORS WHO 
SERVED IN THE HOUSE IN 
1984 AND IN THE 
SENATE IN 1986 
2 Yes on both bills: 1 
Absent on BC bill / Yes on MHRA bill: 1 
TOTALS Total number of seats in the Missouri General Assembly: 197 
Total number of legislators with chances to vote on both bills: 161 (81.7%) 
Total number who voted yes on both bills: 125 (63.4% of total seats) 
(77.6% OF POSSIBLE VOTES) 
 
 
 
